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**MODERN METATHEORETICAL
APPROACHES TO ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS**

Among the many approaches to the analysis of consciousness, the author singles out those that, as their methodological basis, have the idea of a metatheoretical level of research, which, perhaps, is the most effective. The article identifies three types of approaches working in this direction - quasi-theoretical, natural-scientific and philosophical.

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The purpose of this article is to comprehend and systematize existing metatheoretical ideas in the field of consciousness. In modern scientific and philosophical thought, three types of metatheoretical approaches to the consideration of the field of consciousness can be distinguished. Although this classification is relative, it is nevertheless well founded.

The first type, conventionally called quasi-theoretical, includes all constructions that consider consciousness mainly in a mystical way, as a metatheoretical method and offer special spiritual practices. The most prominent representative of this type can be called K. Wilber, whose work takes place within the framework of transpersonal psychology. He develops a kind of integral theory of the whole world, part of which is the integral theory of consciousness [1]. K. Wilber tries in his own way to comprehend, theoretically reflect the conscious activity, taking into account its methodological uniqueness. But he does this through rational-discursive constructions based on spiritual, mainly Eastern practices. It should be noted, that such constructions do not have academic significance in and of themselves and are more a part of spiritual and cultural life than science-based programs. At the same time, they are interesting as attempts to realize consciousness from the standpoint of reaching the metatheoretical level.

The second type of metatheoretical approaches to the analysis of consciousness should include research within the framework of natural science subject areas. This includes a very wide range of disciplines, but the common point for them is the approach to understanding this methodological feature of consciousness and the desire to overcome it by reaching the metatheoretical level of research. Among them, research in the field of quantum physics should be noted. Yugoslavian physicists M. Dugi, MM Kirkovich, D. Rakovich [2] try to construct a metatheory of consciousness on the basis of quantum-physical principles with the help of studies of the "wave function of collapse". In the field of computer science, Italian experts F. Guinciglia, P. Traverso, A. Cimatti [3] develop the semantic component of the metatheory of consciousness with the aim of using it in creating "conscious" software. In the field of research in neuropsychology and cognitive psychology, the work of the American psychologist J.V. Skoler [4], who distinguishes meta-awareness into a special kind of consciousness for considering dissociative states of consciousness. It is worth pointing out that, due to their specific, directed specialization, these researchers are not engaged in the construction of the actual metatheory of consciousness, but, developing the details, they provide specific material for the construction of a holistic metatheory.

Works that offer the basic principles of the metatheory of consciousness can be classified as a philosophical type of metatheoretical approaches. In the English-language literature, it includes a fairly large group of researchers working in the field of the so-called higher-order theory of consciousness, the main ideas of which were introduced by the American philosopher D. Rosenthal [5], and the metatheoretical component is being

developed by the American the psychologist D. Dyulani [6] and the specialist in cognitive sciences B. Baars.

When explaining the essence of conscious processes, this group of researchers distinguishes a number of sequences that can pass through mental states. Depending on what stage the mental state is in, it is determined whether it will be conscious. All mental states are proposed to be divided into lower-order states arising from the influence of the external world on the sense organs - sensations; on the first-order state - perception; and higher-order states, which (unlike previous mental states) include a cognitive component. In other words, the last group of mental states has the ability to be aware.

This ability is explained through the term representation (representation), which is based either on direct perception, or already on the processes of thinking.

Thus, theorists of states of consciousness of a higher order argue that only mental states of a higher order are, in the full sense, conscious states, since they take any other mental states as their object, thus, they necessarily include a cognitive element expressed in representation. The mental state will be conscious only when there is a concept of a higher order about it. In other words, neither lower-order states nor first-order states become conscious until they become objects of higher-order states.

As an example, you can cite any elementary sensations or automatic actions, words or deeds that are mental states, but are not conscious. In addition, if the content of perception can be expressed through the statement "hurt", then the content of a higher-order representation is expressed through the statement "it seems to hurt." It is worth noting that such a division is not, in the full sense, a metatheory of consciousness, but here one can see a rather close approximation to a metatheoretical analysis. In connection with the predominantly applied orientation of American science, these studies bear a fairly strong empirical imprint.

We find the original version of the metatheoretical approach to the analysis of consciousness among the Soviet philosophers M.K. Mamardashvili and A.M. Pyatigorsky. Their works represent a purely philosophical discourse, which shows how with the onset of a special cognitive act - awareness of conscious activity - a new kind of consciousness is born, which begins to "understand itself". Conscious processes of this kind are called "struggle with consciousness" and are the direct content of both reflection and philosophical activity. Thus, they go beyond the traditional understanding of consciousness and rise to the metatheoretical level, where the object of cognition is not consciousness in its pure form, but the forms through which it understands itself.

It should be noted that any mental process always appears in two forms: independently and in terms of its awareness ("I see that", "I think that"). Understanding and interpretation are singled out as basic conscious processes. In addition, conscious processes perform a double function: they both construct objects of reality, and determine the conditions under which they are perceived. The so-called pragmemes, which are meta-statements about objects, play an important role in this. The specificity of conscious processes, indicated by philosophers, is that the predicate of reality is ascribed not only to actual reality, but also to its comprehension, understanding and further interpretation. A simple awareness of reality is impossible, since it is always determined by the pre-understanding situation in which consciousness is located.

Consequently, we can conclude that in scientific-theoretical activity it is necessary to consider the actual world always from the angle of its involvement in the conscious process. It is fundamentally important not to confuse the results of conscious activity with reality itself and not to consider the objectification of consciousness as objectively existing. It is proposed to overcome such difficulties by means of the original method of reflection, where the subject appears not as generating states and structures of consciousness, but, on the contrary, as embedded in them and conscious through them. This is a different way of reflection, in which awareness occurs as an understanding of one's own involvement in the sphere of consciousness, where the processes of awareness are carried out independently of the conscious subject himself, that is, it is proposed to bring the constructions of one's own self-awareness beyond the framework of the cognitive act.

Summing up the short review of modern metatheoretical developments in the field of the study of consciousness, we see their structural diversity. Based on the central position of theoretical and philosophical methodology, it can be noted that we meet its general position, both in attempts to obtain direct observation of consciousness in transpersonal psychology, and in a double interpretation when explaining neural activity. It is worth highlighting the fact that the theoretical-philosophical block is quite well developed in the Russian school of philosophy by M.K. Mamardashvili, who was an outstanding representative of philosophizing as such. Philosophizing, which, in essence, is a direct presence in consciousness itself and thinking "through" and "through" consciousness.

In world scientific thought today, the moment of personal, discursive philosophizing often gives way to the experimental practice of observing someone else's consciousness by analyzing behavior under given conditions. Our goal will be to integrate these philosophical and theoretical premises for the greatest adequacy of interdisciplinary research both in the field of consciousness and in cognitive activity.

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