

Azerbaijan's territorial issues in Turkish-Russian talks (Treaties of Moscow and Kars)

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Abstract

After the signing of the Treaty of Mudros (October 30, 1918), the Ottoman Empire began to be subjected to pressure from the Entente powers. The Entente powers, trying to resolve the Eastern Question in their own interests, put forward conditions that were not reflected in the treaty and applied a policy of division and division against the Ottoman Empire. This caused serious protests among the military and civilian Turkish ruling circles. In accordance with the existing political conditions at that time, the Turkish authorities hoped only for the help of Bolshevik Russia against the Entente powers. The occupation of Istanbul on March 16, 1920, led to a decisive change in the positions of the leaders of the Independence Struggle. The occupation of a large part of the Ottoman Empire by the Entente powers created very fertile political conditions for the establishment of Turkish-Russian relations. The Bolsheviks' activities in the Caucasus and the successive defeats of Denikin's forces gave Kazim Garabekir Pasha great hope for establishing contact with the Bolsheviks and led him to begin his activities.

Keywords: Turkey, Russia, Azerbaijan, territorial issues, Moscow Treaty, Kars Treaty

After its defeat in World War I, the Ottoman Empire was forced to sign the Treaty of Mudros (October 30, 1918). After that, the pressure of the Entente powers on the Ottoman Empire began to increase. The Entente powers, trying to resolve the Eastern Question in their own interests, put forward conditions that were not reflected in the treaty and applied a divide and conquer policy against the Ottoman Empire. This caused serious protests among the military and civilian Turkish ruling circles.

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The Police Society established in Istanbul also thought of taking advantage of the Bolsheviks and attempted many secret initiatives. During this period, the leaders of the War of Independence also wanted to establish contact with the Bolsheviks in accordance with the demands of the time. However, initially, the leaders of the National Struggle, while intending to establish contact with the Bolsheviks, aimed to pursue a neutral policy between them and the Entente states. However, the withdrawal of British military forces from the Caucasus and the increase in political and military pressure by the Entente states on Turkey led to the leaders of the National Struggle no longer remaining neutral. It was becoming clear that independence could be achieved by force. For this, outside help was needed. The only way out was the Turkish gate, or in other words, the "Eastern gate". In this way, the necessary help could be provided. Seeing that Turkey was turning towards the Bolsheviks, the Entente states might perhaps be forced to maintain a moderate attitude towards Turkey. Therefore, this issue was discussed between Mustafa Kemal Pasha, Kazim Garabakir and Rauf Bey, who were busy preparing for the Erzurum Conference, and it was decided that Kazim Garabakir Pasha would be entrusted with maintaining contact with the Bolsheviks, and Dr. Ömer Lütfi Bey was sent to Baku and Dr. Fuad (Sabit) Bey to Moscow (8, 110; 5, 12-19).

In September 1919, the former commander of the Eastern Armies, Khalil Pasha, who arrived in Sivas, was instructed by Mustafa Pasha to establish contacts with Soviet Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan and provide the necessary assistance for the struggle for independence. Khalil Pasha came to Baku and played a major role in establishing Turkish-Soviet relations. Meanwhile, Baha Said Bey was sent to Baku by the Police Society to establish contacts with the Bolsheviks.

In the early 1920s, important changes began to occur in the South Caucasus and Russia. The uprisings that began in the North Caucasus against Denikin caused great concern in the Entente states. In such circumstances, the Entente states had only one way to keep Baku oil, close the Iran-Iraq road, and prevent the Soviets from uniting with the Anatolian movement. It was necessary to create a barrier consisting of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. However, the Entente states did not have the strength to implement this project. British forces had begun to leave the Caucasus since August and September 1919. However, they had some military forces in Batumi. They had pinned all their hopes on Denikin. From the beginning of 1920, that hope also began to fade. Mustafa Kemal Pasha and Kazim Garabekir Pasha were closely following the events taking place in the Caucasus.

On February 6, 1920, Mustafa Kemal Pasha sent a telegram to Kazim Garabekir Pasha, in which he discussed the events in the Caucasus and expressed his views. In his opinion, the Entente powers were planning to create a “Caucasian barrier” to prevent the Turkish-Soviet rapprochement, which was harmful to them. The implementation of such a plan would mean the suffocation of the National Struggle movements in Turkey. Therefore, they should declare official or illegal mobilization on the Eastern Front, make military preparations to destroy the “Caucasian barrier” from behind, establish contacts with the Caucasian governments and determine their intentions against the Entente powers’ plan, and if they did not receive a suitable response, reach an agreement with the Bolsheviks regarding the attack (2, 329).

The Bolsheviks' activity in the Caucasus in early March and the successive defeats of Denikin's forces had greatly encouraged Kazim Garabekir Pasha to establish contact with the Bolsheviks and had led him to begin his activities. The pasha, who recommended relations with the Bolsheviks in the information he sent to the Azerbaijani government, also informed Khalil Pasha and Nuri Pasha of this issue on March 12. The occupation of Istanbul on March 16, 1920, led to a decisive change in the positions of the leaders of the Independence Struggle.

Kazim Garabekir Pasha, in a letter he sent to Khalil and Nuru Pasha on March 17, 1920, stated that the Bolsheviks' invasion of the Caucasus and even their movement towards the border with Azerbaijanis with a small force was beneficial for Turkey. He stated that it was expedient to ensure the spread of Bolshevism ideas in Azerbaijan and Dagestan.

To achieve this goal, a Turkish communist party was established in Baku with the help of Azerbaijani communists. This party, which included Khalil Pasha, Dr. Fuad Sabit, Baha Said, Commander-in-Chief Mustafa, reserve officer Suleyman, captain Yaqub, junior Talat, former Zor district chief Salih Zaki, Suleyman Nuri, and Hilmi, worked together with Russian and Azerbaijani Bolsheviks and served as a bridge between the leaders of the National Struggle and the Bolsheviks (7, 580; 1, 105).

The occupation of Azerbaijan by the Bolsheviks from April 27, 1920, the opening of the Grand National Assembly on April 23, 1920, the coming to power of the Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan, and the arrival of the Red Army in the region undoubtedly constituted a turning point in Turkish-Soviet relations. The Chairman of the Grand National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, based on the idea of Kazım Garabekir Pashanım, prepared the first official proposal to the government of Soviet Russia on April 26 and sent it to Erzurum for delivery to Baku (2, 331).

These proposals to be delivered to the government of Soviet Russia were sent to Moscow via Novorossiysk on June 8 through Lieutenant Ibrahim Bey. The purpose of the people who left Bayazid and went to Azerbaijan via Nakhchivan was not only to carry documents. They were to obtain extensive information about the Bolsheviks who had just arrived in Azerbaijan and, in particular, to determine whether the Bolsheviks had any connections with the British. In addition, they were to inform the leading figures of the region that the Azerbaijanis would continue their attack on Armenia and would unite with the Turkish forces in Nakhchivan. In order to fulfill this task, the Chief of Staff of the 11th Division, Veysel Bey, and Lieutenants Kamil Bey and Celal Bey left Bayazid on May 6 (2, 332).

Kazim Garabakir Pasha, on the one hand, continued his preparations for an attack on Armenia, and on the other hand, he was working hard from Erzurum to establish contact with Soviet Russia. After the official proposals sent to Moscow for the first time on May 8, a delegation had to be sent for official meetings. The TBMM government (after its formation on May 3) organized a delegation consisting of the Minister of Internal Affairs Bekir Sami Bey and the Minister of Finance Yusif Kemal Bey, who would go to Moscow on May 5. Meanwhile, Kazim Garabakir Pasha was very worried. He asked Mustafa Kemal Pasha to immediately send a delegation to Moscow on May 5-6. According to the information the Pasha received, the Armenians and Georgians intended to establish contact with the Bolsheviks. It was necessary to take immediate action. Even a lost day would be detrimental to the country. While correspondence between Ankara and Erzurum continued, the delegation going to Moscow arrived in Erzurum on July 25. Since Bekir Sami Bey did not want to go by sea, the detachment decided to go by the Bayazid-Nakhchivan road. They went as far as Maku. However, according to information received from the commander of the 11th division, Javid Bey, the road was dangerous, so they turned back and set off for Soviet Russia by the Black Sea on July 11 (9, 141-144).

The official delegation to Russia continued its journey via Ankara-Erzurum, while many important events took place in Moscow. The desired relations between Turkey and Soviet Russia had been established for 9 months. Khalil Pasha and Dr. Fuad Sabit arrived on May 16, the courier Lieutenant Ibrahim Bey, who had left Trabzon, arrived on May 17, Cemal Pasha, who was in Germany with Enver Pasha and other unionists, arrived on March 27, as well as Dr. Bahaddin Shakir and Badri Beys. Halil Pasha and other leaders, including him, held meetings with the Soviet ruling circles in Moscow, asking for necessary assistance for Turkey, and the official courier

Ibrahim Bey also presented the proposals he brought from Ankara to the Soviet Foreign Commissariat and, having received Chicherin's reply letter, set off for Anatolia (8, 152-155).

However, Kazim Garabakir Pasha did not like Chicheri's reply letter. Because Chicheri's proposal to peacefully resolve the relations and border between Turkey and Armenia was considered expedient by the TBMM, which did not want to oppose Soviet Russia with an attack on Armenia, and Kazim Garabakir Pasha was informed of the postponement of the operation. The suspension of operations not only postponed the fulfillment of the goals that Kazim Garabakir Pasha and the TBMM government intended to implement, but also eliminated the possibility of establishing contact with the Bolsheviks for the time being. In fact, the Turkish ruling circles knew very well that with a victory they would neutralise Armenia, which was preventing contact with Azerbaijan. However, now the intervention of Soviet Russia, the postponement of the Turkish attack and the cessation of military operations by the Bolsheviks in Zangezur emboldened the Armenians. Therefore, they began to make preparations around Nakhchivan and Zangibasar to prevent the Turkish-Bolshevik connection, which they considered dangerous for them. They even attacked the Zangibasar region on July 19.

During this period, a military unit was sent to Nakhchivan to protect the population. However, this was not enough to protect the region. The population of Nakhchivan was in danger. The Zangezur road, which would connect with Azerbaijan, had to be opened immediately. On June 22, Kazim Garabakir Pasha learned from a letter he received from Naim Javad Bey that the Bolsheviks were active in Karabakh and that they would most likely come to Nakhchivan. It was necessary to bring the Bolsheviks to Nakhchivan. Kazim Garabakir Pasha, who was in the midst of these thoughts, decided to call the Bolsheviks to the border in any way that had been discussed with the delegation and the TBMM government and even Khalil Pasha in Baku, and personally raised the issue with the command of the 11th Red Army and the Azerbaijani military commissariat. Pasha, who asked the Azerbaijani military commissariat to be constantly ready for battle against the Armenians with his letter dated June 23, wrote in a letter dated July 24 to the commander of the 11th Red Army, Levandovsky: "It is necessary to establish a loyal relationship between the Russian Soviet army and the Turkish army. "In order to put an end to the war waged by Turkey against the imperialist British and their allies in the western provinces, and to the ongoing British propaganda in Azerbaijan, it is more important that you immediately occupy Zangezur and establish contact with our part in Nakhchivan" (7, 774; 6, 7-10).

While the Turkish delegation was in Moscow, the representative of Soviet Russia in the Caucasus, B. Legan, began negotiations with the Dashnak government, and on August 10, 1920, the Russian-Armenian treaty was signed. According to the treaty, Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhchivan remained under the temporary administration of the Soviets, and the Gyumri-Shahtakhti-Julfa railway could be used by Armenians, except for military cargo. The Bolsheviks also promised to acquire land for Armenians in Anatolia (4, 390).

After this, the first official Russian-Turkish meeting was held in Moscow on August 13, 1920. At this meeting, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Bolshevik Russia, G. Chicherin, "stated that the Turks would be assisted if the Van and Bitlis provinces were given to the Armenians." The Turkish delegation strongly objected to this proposal, and this meeting was fruitless (4, 391).

The Turkish delegation met with V.I. Lenin on August 14 as a way out of the crisis. After this meeting, certain hopes arose in the negotiations and it was decided to continue the negotiations.

On August 17, 1920, the RSFSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs appointed Sabanin and Adamov as representatives of the Soviet side to discuss the basis of the treaty to be signed with the Turks. A draft treaty consisting of 8 articles was prepared between August 17 and 24. However, G. Chicherin's insistence on the proposal to ask for land for Armenians in Anatolia led to the non-signature of the treaty and the negotiations were suspended. However, Soviet financial and military aid was sent to Anatolia with the returning Turkish representatives (9, 181).

In the fall of 1920, Turkey began military operations against Armenia and, having gained a great military advantage, signed the Gyumri Treaty with Armenia. Articles 2 and 12 of the Gyumri Treaty, consisting of 18 articles, concluded on the night of December 2-3, are related to Nakhchivan. According to Article 2, the borders and status of Nakhchivan were determined as follows: Article 2: Kuku Mountain 10282-8022 - Kamasor Mountain 8160 - Gurdgulaq Village-Sayat Mountain 7868 - On the Arpa River 3080 - Gomurlu Mountain 6930 - Saray Spring-8071. The form of governance in the Nakhchivan, Shahtakhti, and Sharur regions south of the strip passing through the Ararat station, the Araz River, and the confluence of the Ashaghi Garasu will be determined through a general vote, and Armenia will not interfere in the lands covered by this administration, and a local administration will be established in this region under the auspices of Turkey for the time being;

Article 12: The Turkish government undertakes to ensure the security of the transit route between Iran-Maku-Armenia via Sharur-Nakhchivan-Shahtakhti and Julfa (2, 390).

According to the Gyumri Treaty, apart from Develi and Arazdayan, the borders of today's Nakhchivan were almost determined, for some reason, the historically Turkish regions of Ulukhanli, Gamarli, and most importantly, Boyuk Vedi, which protected Nakhchivan from Armenian attacks until 1920, and many surrounding villages were given to the Armenians, and the northwestern border of Nakhchivan was Develi. Armenia will not interfere in the administrative system to be established in the Nakhchivan region after the referendum, and a local administration will be established in the region under Turkish control.

The conclusion of the Gyumri Treaty caused concern in Russia. Also, the possibility of Turkey reaching an agreement with Western powers led to Russia taking a step back and changing its previous position on the issue of "granting land to Armenians in Anatolia."

It was decided to resume negotiations on the initiative of the parties. On December 14, 1920, a delegation was sent from Ankara to Moscow. The delegation included Yusif Kemal (chairman), Riza Nur and Saffet Bey. The Turkish delegation, which arrived in Moscow at the end of February 1921, began official meetings on February 26. Soviet Russia was represented at the Moscow negotiations by G. Chicherin and J. Gorkhmazov.

Issues related to Azerbaijan were the subject of discussion at the Moscow conference. These issues were of great importance for the country, namely "Nakhchivan" and "Azerbaijan's independence". The Turkish side attached great importance to the Nakhchivan issue in these negotiations. This was because Nakhchivan was the closest point in Turkey-Azerbaijan relations and played a major mediating role in Moscow-Ankara relations (10, 302).

In the Moscow negotiations, the Turkish side wanted Nakhchivan to remain under Turkish protection. However, the Russian side categorically rejected this. In this situation, the Turkish delegation again met with I. Stalin and discussed the issue. The representative of Azerbaijan, B. Shakhtakhtinsky, also participated in this meeting.

When I. Stalin asked B. Shakhtakhtinsky's opinion on the Nakhchivan issue, he stated that it was acceptable for Nakhchivan to remain an independent state under the protection of Russia.

The status of Nakhchivan was fully determined during the conference held on March 14, 1921. It was agreed that Nakhchivan would remain within Azerbaijan, provided that no concessions were made to any state (4, 399).

The parties, who also resolved other issues at the Moscow conference, signed the Moscow Treaty on March 18. This treaty defined the territorial issues of Azerbaijan as follows:

ARTICLE 3

Both Contracting Parties agree to the formation of the Nakhchivan region as an autonomous territory under the protection of Azerbaijan within the borders specified in Annex I (C) to this Treaty, provided that Azerbaijan will never cede this protectorate to a third state.

The triangle formed between the east of the Araz thalweg of the Nakhchivan territory and the line Dahne Dag (3829) - Veli Dag (4121) - Bagirsag (6587) - Gomurlu Dag (6930), the border line of these lands starting from Gomurlu Dag (6930), passing through Saray Bulag Dag (8071) and Ararat station and ending at the confluence of the Black Water with the Araz, will be corrected by a commission consisting of authorized representatives of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Appendix 1 (C)

Nakhchivan territory:

Ararat station - Saraybulag mountain (8071) - Gomurlu mountain (8839) - (8930) - (3080) - Sayat mountain (7868) - Gurdgulaq (Kurt Kulak) village - Hamasur mountain (8160) - 8022 altitude - Kuku mountain (10282) and east of the administrative borders of the former Nakhchivan district.

This Treaty is drawn up in duplicate at Moscow on March 16, 1921 (one thousand three hundred and thirty-seven).

Yusif Kamal Georgi Chicherin

Dr. Riza Light Jalal Gorkhmazov

Ali Fuad (See :11).

Russia with negotiations successfully concluding Turkish representative staff 1921 Soviet Union on April 1 from the government 4 million received gold ruble with help From Moscow movement did and to Baku on April 8 arrived in Baku where in the process Turkish representative staff With Azerbaijan separate one contract to close initiative if he does also Russia serious from the pressure then this agreement head did not catch (4, 402).

Turkish of the staff From Baku on the road fallen day - April 19 , 1921 in history Azerbaijan Foreign Jobs Commissioner MDHuseynov and Justice Commissioner B.Shahtakhtinsiki between in the future South Caucasus Republics with Turkey between In Kars conference holding about consent obtained was made (4, 407).

Russia and Turkey carried negotiations and Azerbaijan side of also in process activity as a result Kars conference 1921 scheduled for September 26 was done .

Conference on the eve of - 1921 Turkish on September 22 and Russian representative staff March 16 , 1921 dated Moscow of the contract ratification document exchange they did .

Kars The conference opened on September 26, 1921. At the conference Azerbaijan worker-peasant control commissioner well-being Shakhtakhtinski , Georgia military and sea works commissioner Salva Eliava and foreign affairs and finance Commissioner Alexander Svanidze , Armenia foreign affairs commissioner Askanaz Mravyan and internal affairs commissioner Pogos Makinisyanyan , Russia while mediator like In Latvia authorized representative Yakov Ganetsky representation was doing . Turkey while East front commander Kazim Garabakir Pasha , in the Turkish Grand National Assembly Burdur nation lawyer Parent sir , Ankara In Azerbaijan diplomatic Representative Memduh Shevket and Eastern Anatolian Iron Ways Construction head engineer Mukhtar gentleman representation was doing (4, 409).

This at the conference Turkey side every one republic with separately contract closing insistence if he does also , but Russia and other republic representatives from protest then Turkey with South Caucasus republics between unit one of the contract closure to decide received .

At the conference Nakhchivan issue with closed special discussion gone . Long- lasting dispute and from discussions then on October 13, 1921 , Russia participation with Turkey with Azerbaijan , Georgia and Armenia between Kars contract signed . 20 articles and 3 additions consisting of which this contract some small changes into account if not received, dated March 16, 1921 Moscow of the contract is the same .

Kars Article 5 of the treaty It belonged to Nakhchivan . That one in the article was shown :

" Turkey" government , Soviet Armenia and Azerbaijan governments Nakhchivan province current in Annex III of the agreement shown border inside Azerbaijan patronage under autonomous territory organize to do they agree ."

Appendix 3. Nakhchivan territory Urmia village - from there straight with a line Arazdeyan to the station (it) Armenia Socialist Soviet To the Republic (with saving) - then straight west of line 3142 Dashburun to the mountain - Dashburun of the mountain east separator line (4108) - Hell valley The inscription " bulag " from the river south - Bagarsiq of the mountain let's go line with (6607 and or 6587) and from there previous Yerevan of the circle and Sharur-Deralayaz accident administrative border with going - 6629 altitude - Coal mountain (6839 and or 6930) - from there 3080 altitude - Sayat mountain (7868 - Gurdgulaq village) Gamesur Mountain (8160) - 8022 altitude - Kükü mountain (10282) and previous Nakhchivan of the circle administrative border from the east pass .

On October 13, 1921 (1337) in Kars , five from a copy consisting of compilation (See : 3).

Kars contract with Armenia also has Nakhchivan Azerbaijan territory that officially confirmation did . The contract the most important from the sides one also this of the contract indefinite signing was .

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