

Title: Manifestations of hermeneutic philosophical discourse in Gadamer's philosophy and hermeneutic stakes in human sciences research

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Abstract

Ideas change the world, and history becomes the living reflection of thought, expressing the concerns of its era and probing its open ontology. It is in this context that the rational approach emerges, born from an awareness of the need for reason to adopt methods that explore the boundaries of truth. Interpretation thus becomes more than a tool—it becomes a philosophy in itself, drawn from the depths of reason and imagination. It stands apart from traditional approaches that viewed ideas as mere echoes of prior truths. Through Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutics, this study highlights the role of interpretation as a dynamic process of understanding. Gadamer sees hermeneutics as a way to revive the spirit of comprehension by challenging rigid readings and reconnecting thought with lived experience. In this view, truth is no longer a fixed absolute but a continuous dialogue between subject and object, between tradition and modernity. Thus, Gadamerian hermeneutics offers a critical path toward a renewed understanding of the world by rejecting dogmatic certainties and embracing both the limitations and possibilities of human reason.

Keywords: Hermeneutics - Ontology - Understanding - Human Sciences - Philosophical Discourse - Historical Consciousness.

Introduction

When interpretation becomes a system and structure, it departs from unity to adopt multiplicity. Its realms are vast, detesting stagnant conformity, engaging in dynamic action free from the constraints of superficiality and the despised certainties—ontologically, philosophically, and epistemologically. We are witnessing, at times, an overturning of concepts and a demystification of Cartesian rational discourse, as the cogito descends from its ivory tower to settle within the open epistemic ontology of interpretation. Thus, the hermeneutical cogito transforms into a foundational interpretive framework equivalent to the assumptions of intellectual consciousness, tied to Heideggerian notions of human finitude. The aim of this research paper is to destabilize concepts and probe the nature of truth, in pursuit of a

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more luminous form of expression than previous rejected formulations—hoping to move beyond illusion and forms of belief-based mythologizing emptied of argumentative and explanatory substance.

Here, then, begins the sound act striving toward the governance of value and the exploration of its practical impact. In defiance of the obstacles posed by the passive/inactive self, there is a tendency toward understanding the self before the subject. There is no doubt that alienation has stripped ideas and theories of their identity, as they veered away from the structures of genuine knowledge. Epistemic necessity grips us, granting a precious opportunity to overturn prevailing methodologies. Through the uprisings of consciousness and historical awareness, the mind reaches itself by developing revolutionary actions that challenge the system of timid ideas and speculations, particularly in the field of human sciences and their dismal attempts at understanding the human being and the dilemmas surrounding it.

The radical breaks in thought and the resolution of tests regarding the failure and despair of non-understanding have driven philosophers of science, including Gadamer, to pursue bold critical inquiries in order to restore the value and status of the human sciences among the disciplines of their time—despite the difficulty of this mission. In line with this vision, Gadamer aspires to reframe the human sciences as cognitive sciences whose truths are linked to historical truth—truth that begins with knowledge through understanding, via the merging of consciousness with self-understanding, and through the connection of revolutionary awareness to awareness within and through historical activity. This reflects the finitude of self-understanding as it attempts to uncover its semiotics and its perpetual drive for liberation, especially in its pursuit of understanding and freeing the hidden repressed self from its psychological shackles.

Undoubtedly, the epistemological foundation of hermeneutic discourse is rational critique, which derives its rationality and comprehension from historical consciousness. Thus, the human experience becomes illuminated by transcending the ontological rigidity buried in the unconscious of docile thought, transforming into a harmonized ontology—a fusion of the existent and the possible. This is the universality of interpretation, intended to reveal how interpretation manifests as deviant readings of the barriers within human experience. Interpretation, then, becomes the humanization of life, in its visible and invisible, secret and public extensions. Hermeneutic discourse is a simulation of the human being who transcends the human condition, rejecting subjective language in favor of instrumental language. Interpretation here becomes a comprehensive encyclopedia of understanding, internalizing history through the manifestations of self-awareness, via a profound awareness of the human experience as it progresses from individual action to global activity, where human heritage derives its essence from historical heritage.

Affirming the ontological presence of the interpretive self is an acknowledgment of the clearly reasoned beginning of the hermeneutic cogito—more lucid and beneficial than the Cartesian rational cogito. Similarly, the presence of the “I” in hermeneutic discourse marks a moment of revealing the habitual imprisonment of being in thought, and presents a renewed argumentative justification for the dynamic manifestation of the ontological act—the act of profound understanding that enables the continuous re-creation of creative awareness, expressed in hermeneutic linguistic discourse. Thus, the identity of the interpreting human being is revealed, for they are not bound by a predefined uniqueness of ontology within their human realm. Our discourse is investigative in nature, employing an analytical approach that seeks to deconstruct and then update the initial structure of our central problem: What epistemic impact illuminates the manifestations of philosophical hermeneutic discourse in Gadamer’s philosophy? And what stakes can we realistically recognize for hermeneutic discourse within the research of the human sciences?

As we strive to record the essence of philosophical discourse in a concise form, we recognize the importance and value of this study in the current landscape of epistemological research, particularly within sociological and human sciences. Before all else, however, there is an intrinsic value tied to our intellectual curiosity about the human being—whether known or unknown—through understanding, interpretation, and clarification of their impulses, thoughts, and imaginative horizons, which transcend the boundaries of space and time.

1- Interpretation as a Problematic of Meaning and Necessity

1-1 What is Hermeneutics?

Because the dogmatic modes of interpretive and understanding-based reason have failed to satisfy humanity's need to grasp truth—and because truth sometimes demands surpassing dogmatic comprehension—epistemic necessity has revealed a state of mental awakening that calls for the rationalization of an optimal approach, one that is exceptional rather than common. Interpretation, then, becomes a replacement for previous and current modes and systems of thought, contrary to what non-hermeneuticians have known. This is the essence of hermeneutic philosophy.

So, what is hermeneutics? And what necessity compels the open, dialectical mind to assess, re-establish, and make comprehensible the intellectual need of science and philosophy for a sound hermeneutic discourse?

Interpretation, on the surface, is not a new subject; it has been analyzed and problematized by philosophers and scholars throughout the ages. It has followed two main paths: the religious and the secular. Those who believe that interpretation is merely a method restricted by methodological boundaries are mistaken—it is an art, a science, and a philosophy.

"Hermeneutics is the art or theory of interpretation. It is also regarded as a branch of philosophy that begins with questions of interpretation. Its emergence is particularly associated with the interpretation of sacred texts, and the term gained significant importance in the twentieth century in connection with the historical development of German philosophy. There are two competing meanings of interpretation: the first, adopted by Dilthey, limits it to interpretation or understanding as the methodological foundation of the historical and human sciences. The second, championed by Heidegger, views it as an ontological event... In general, interpretation is the analysis of this process and the identification of its possible conditions. Traditionally, early interpretations tended to focus on sacred texts and the histories of ancient peoples whose understanding remained problematic." (Audi, 1999, p. 37)

While Schleiermacher's epistemic endeavor aimed to activate a theory of understanding through linguistic expressions related to texts and speech signs, these methodological efforts were embodied by Dilthey in his hermeneutic theory. This theory sought to enable the mind to interpret and understand the human sciences (the historical and human sciences) by re-experiencing the subjective experiences of others. Such a method reveals the possibility of attaining objective knowledge about the human being—knowledge that cannot be accessed through empirical investigation.

"Hermeneutics originally focused on interpreting sacred texts and human conditions. It raises the issue of uncovering the hidden meaning behind the literal one—for example, revealing the concealed truth within the Bible. It was only later that hermeneutics came to define this specific branch of philosophy concerned with the methodology of interpreting and understanding texts. The hermeneutic approach, when applied analogically—as Dilthey especially advocated—to human and social realities instead of texts, consists of:

- (1) Considering these realities as texts to be deciphered, in the sense that they represent a primary reality pointing to a secondary, significant, and intelligible one;
 - (2) Defining the conditions and criteria for validating any interpretation of this kind.
- Two prominent examples support this line of thought: history and Freudian psychoanalysis." (Soler, 2019, p. 67)

Gadamer, in his work *Philosophy of Hermeneutics*, provided a definition of hermeneutics, stating: (Gadamer, 1900)

"The word *hermeneutics* means 'the art of interpretation,' as is the case with the term derived from Greek, which has become integrated into our scientific language and spread across various levels of thought. Hermeneutics, above all, refers to an intellectual practice guided by both method and art. This is evoked by the form of the word, which refers to the Greek concept of *technē* (τέχνη). Here, art implies proclamation, tradition, explanation, and interpretation. Naturally, it also includes the art of understanding as its foundation and essential support—especially when something cannot be understood in a direct or unambiguous manner." (Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 61)

And since historical and socio-cultural determinisms tend to alter the structures of human societies, the emergence of intellectual visions within the knowledge system brought with it semantic and conceptual shifts—such as the concept of interpretation (ta'wīl). Interpretation has long been associated with the emergence of texts, closely linked to linguistic expressions and philological inquiries. The precedence of interpretative efforts was notably in relation to theological texts during the medieval period, driven by the need to transcend the literal meaning of words or texts and to attempt to uncover the essence of their spiritual and metaphysical meanings. As Augustine explained in *On Christian Doctrine*, the spirit (or intellect) rises above the literal and moral meaning to attain the spiritual meaning. (Hans-Georg, 2006)

There is no doubt that most textual interpretations focus on linguistic and verbal texts. However, symbolic interpretation also held a notable place in ancient philosophy, particularly with the Sophist school. Thus, “the central concern of ancient hermeneutics is revealed in the problem of symbolic interpretation, which is a very old form of interpretation. The inner meaning, or *Hyponoya*, is an ancient term that referred to symbolic meaning, as this type of interpretation was used during the time of the Sophists.” (Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 64)

1-2 The Requirements of Interpretation

Like other phenomena and research-related problems of the mind, the interpretive phenomenon has its own prerequisites and motivations. There is no doubt that it possesses both ontological and historical presence. It is also certain that the sciences and philosophies of humanity tend toward relativity, plausible approximations, and probabilities. In this context, assumptions have been considered as epistemological and methodological approaches. Along the same lines, hermeneutic philosophy has aimed to track the deficiencies of understanding and the ruptures of clarity, rather than advancing the growth and progress of our comprehension in the face of human historical and ontological problems.

“The hermeneutic problem took shape before Husserl’s phenomenology... The interpretive issue first arose within the limits of explanation—that is, within a science that presents itself as one dedicated to understanding the text, interpreting it based on its intent and what it seeks to express. If explanation has stirred an interpretive problem, that is to say a hermeneutic problem... it does so within a nation and its traditions, from within a living intellectual current, all of which foster assumptions and requirements.” (Ricoeur & Ihde, 1989, p. 33) In this sense, hermeneutics does not oppose explanation and understanding—but rather demands them in order to achieve a deeper and better comprehension.

What contemporary studies confirm is that the birth of interpretive philosophy was not easy, for its fate was to come to light only after a difficult birth. It faced objections and criticisms—either because of the defense of dialectics regarding its manifestations, which were fraught with potential danger to knowledge systems and their research methods, or due to fears that ideological influences might obscure clear explanatory intentions and the adequacy of established methodologies for presenting and discussing knowledge topics in general. Gadamer highlights the essence of this critical stance in his statement: “Many have seen, and still see, interpretive philosophy as a departure from methodological rationalism. Others have misused the term and what it signifies, viewing it as a methodological principle used to justify methodological ambiguity or ideological concealment. This is the current situation, whereby interpretation has become a fashion, and every explanation wants to call itself interpretation. Others, belonging to the camp of ideology critique, recognize in this term the truth... They argue that it is good to realize the significance of the prejudgments inherent in tradition.” (Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 299)

What is certain in the research of the philosophy of science (epistemology) is that epistemic truth is not separate from historical truth, just as interpretive truth is not momentary but accompanies historical continuity. “Epistemology draws on the history of science to extract the primary truths necessary for its analysis. While epistemology directs us to study the history of scientific disciplines, models, and theories, it also contributes to understanding the current state of science by tracing the development of researchers’ investigations and analyzing the nature of that development... thereby understanding the synchronic context of the evolution of cognitive theories.” (Sagaut, 2008, p. 12)

There is a deliberate or inadvertent neutralization of history that weakens the resolve of reason and obstructs the intuitive discoveries of science, just as it prevents the induction and full understanding of comprehensive knowledge. For this reason, it has been clearly and logically demonstrated that the static and deterministic interpretation of historical events and facts is inadequate. History is the source of truth. Cicero was accurate when he called it the life of memory, *Vita Memoria*, and noted that it exists independently because human desires cannot be governed by the universal rules of reason. Indeed, in this world, one needs convincing examples that only history can provide, and this is the very reason Bacon considered history, which supplies us with such examples, as another realistic way of philosophizing. (Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 74)

Throughout history and through it, truth flows, revealing within it and through it the currents of reason and the steadfastness of imagination, as it is drawn toward a re-rationalization of reality by representing the inputs of human experience in its growth and changing elements. Experience has been and remains the origin of the growth and advancement of knowledge, characterized by a consciousness that is more present and dynamic. Ontology of consciousness that transcends mere awareness draws from the intensity of creative energies within the self, surpassing impressions and preconceived ideas that have not been grasped with more precise and clearer understanding, as they remain veiled by unconscious coverings linked to naive emotional experiences.

2- Manifestations of the Philosophical Hermeneutic Discourse in Gadamer's Philosophy:

2-1 Hermeneutics and the Alienation of Understanding

If understanding, in the dialogical-communicative sense used by thinkers, is merely an agreement between the self and the other, then this understanding is a non-understanding disguised under a veil of arbitrary illusion—especially if it does not achieve sufficient epistemic comprehension of the subject of understanding in its particulars and the universality of its general judgments. It is no secret that human understanding has varying levels among observers regarding the cognitive grasp of motives, intentions, and mechanisms enabling hermeneutic truth. Since understanding can be distinguished from interpretation in the epistemological approach to knowledge issues in general—interpretation being limited to objective conditions and rules—understanding can become more complex if it is not rationalized according to the structural logical conditions of thought. Often it mixes with drives and motives that may obscure or deviate from objectivity. This is the current mesological dilemma of thought. "A genuine interpretation must avoid the arbitrariness of illusory ideas that first arise from some unconscious habits of thinking... It is also clear that faithful understanding of a text's meaning, for example, is not a simple or obscure matter of 'good and innocent intentions,' but rather establishes the meaning itself of the problem that Heidegger identified as the primary, ongoing, and final activity of hermeneutic understanding." (Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 44). We often misjudge our own judgments, resulting in expressive fallacies—an isolated but serious semantic error that threatens to bury the truth at its very inception. Let us reflect on some common expressions we take as self-evident foundations for our discourse, through which we confiscate our own judgments and conclusions, mistakenly believing we possess hermeneutic knowledge. For example, when a speaker says to the listener: "I understand you well," or "I grasp your intention," yet neither party has sufficient grounds to support or validate the statement, because, quite clearly, it is illogical.

"The constant activity of understanding manifests in preparing genuine projects that are automatically coherent with the subject of understanding. In other words, this involves a hermeneutic boldness that expects to be rewarded by confirmation coming from the subject itself. What can be called objectivity here is the presumed confirmation at the moment of preparation... Every interpretation of a text must begin with the interpreter's reflection on the preconceived ideas arising from the interpretive situation in which they find themselves. It is their responsibility to confer upon those ideas a kind of legitimacy—that is, to seek their origin and value." (Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 45). Gadamer's influence from Schleiermacher is evident as he addresses the issue of the alienation of understanding, which he rhetorically frames by calling for an enabling of comprehensive dialogical interpretation. "Schleiermacher's idea of a universal hermeneutics starts from the fact that the experience of the alienation of understanding, and the possibility of misunderstanding, is a universal experience. It is true that this alienation is greater, and misunderstanding easier, in artistic expressions than in non-artistic ones... However, Schleiermacher's

expansion of the hermeneutic task into a meaningful dialogue—something that particularly characterizes him—is exactly what shows how fundamental and profound the change in the meaning of alienation assumed by hermeneutics to overcome is, compared to the hermeneutic task as now conceived. Thus, alienation assumes a new and comprehensive meaning, inherent to the individuality of the ‘you’ (the other)." (Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 264). The artistic impact of the interpretative practice is evident in a clear understanding of the contents of the interpretative text, away from all claims and impositions of moods and impressions. "Hermeneutics had to one day rid itself of all its dogmatic definitions in order to become free and realize itself. In this way, it could rise to the level of a universal historical organon... And through the liberation of interpretation from dogma (Dilthey), the entire body of sacred Christian writings came to be viewed as a collection of historical acts which, as written works, had to be subjected not only to grammatical interpretation but also to historical interpretation." (Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 261). Only on this basis does the sanctity of the Bible dissolve during its interpretative tests, lowering it to the status of a worldly book. For the dogmatism of psychological sacredness has always obstructed the freedom of the mind, depriving it of its identity, and dominant in its judgments is an intuitive doctrinal tendency that turns faith into an obstacle preventing the true connection of reason with the text.

"Schleiermacher sees the primary rule in dealing with texts and words as misunderstanding. He believes that every person errs in understanding the speech and writings of others, and this must be addressed through the rules of hermeneutics. Thus, hermeneutical work begins with the first encounter with the text... Meanwhile, classical hermeneutics holds that the primary rule is correct understanding, and that it is sufficient to observe grammatical rules unless there is ambiguity." (Safdar, 2019, p. 64)

It is time to restore truth to its ontological womb and its historical being so that it may depart from epistemic irrationality. There is no particularity of the concept that distinguishes one field from another, as interpretation will draw from the aforementioned principles to re-establish its foundations according to the rulings of non-dogmatic (liberated) reason. We have no doubt then in entrusting the equivalence between the interpretation of revealed texts and the interpretation of reason, given that interpretation has its historical contexts and determinants.

"And since there is no longer any difference between the interpretation of religious writings and the interpretation of secular writings, and since there is therefore only one hermeneutics, this hermeneutics is not only primarily responsible for serving as a prelude to historical research—that is, the art of correcting literary sources—but also entails the overall work of historical research itself." (Safdar, 2019, p. 262) There is no doubt that historical research implicitly requires working according to the critique of historical reason, in accordance with its system of historical, rational, and dialectical conditions. This critical necessity has been demonstrated by a group of contemporary philosophers such as Dilthey, Simmel, Weber, Rickert, and others. Raymond Aron questioned the essence of the critique of historical reason in his famous work *The Critical Philosophy of History*, saying: "So can we precisely define the concept of the critique of historical reason under these conditions? At first, it seems to us that this concept corresponds to diverse interests and inquiries... Dilthey thought about creating an encyclopedia of the historical sciences, then considered establishing a psychology that would serve as the mathematics of the spiritual world. Ultimately, he limited himself to analyzing the fundamental concepts of the sciences of the mind (or spirit). As for Rickert, he wanted to mature the principles of the 'singular' science logically. Simmel wondered about what separates narration from lived process. Finally, Weber attempted to set the boundaries of historical judgments that can encompass a comprehensive truth." (Aron, 1969, p. 7)

Knowledge of interpretation requires knowledge of history, and any distortion of the pathways and sources of historical truth will inevitably lead to a diminution and normalization of the inferiority of hermeneutical truth. This is what Gadamer demonstrated in his book *Hermeneutics and Philosophy*, saying: "Historical science expresses only one aspect of our real experience, namely that which is integrated with historical tradition for us and can only be known in its estranged form. If something leads to a conflict with interpretive consciousness as a broader assumption that needs development, then it is also necessary in this case to avoid cognitive falsification that affects what is traditionally called 'the science of interpretation,' which has been incorporated into the idea of modern science." (Hans-Georg, 2006)

There is a leap, with a noble elevation in understanding its expression, weaving Gadamerian hermeneutics from a crisis of understanding to an awakening of consciousness, as he examines texts to interpret with reason the necessity of commitment to true understanding. "But the real intention of understanding is this: when we read a text, we seek to understand it, with the expectation that it teaches us something. The consciousness formed from the true interpretive stance is influenced by origins and peculiarities foreign to what is to come from outside... The interpretive stance presupposes only consciousness, which by distinguishing our preconceptions and judgments, describes them as they are, stripping them of their extremity. By realizing this stance, we grant the text the possibility of appearing differently and reveal its pure truth against the ideas we previously imagined."(Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 48)

Gadamer believes that the voice of artistic reason must transcend classical forms of interpretation, as these forms act as obstacles to its liberation and education, while also retaining in it a naivety of consciousness and historical estrangement. In general, interpretation is the analysis of this process and the determination of its possible conditions. Gadamer says: "The hermeneutic question as I have described it is by no means limited to the aforementioned fields. It was merely a matter of affirming the beginning with a theoretical foundation capable of supporting the fundamental truth of our contemporary culture, science, and its technical and industrial applications."(Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 38)

2-2 Interpretation, Consciousness, and Aesthetic Taste: There is no higher purpose for Gadamerian hermeneutic philosophy than achieving the endeavor of elevating truth, as if no thinker had previously succeeded in reaching its goal. Art, or if we prefer to call it artistic aesthetic taste, was one of its pillars. Gadamer presented the philosophy of aesthetics in his work *Heidegger's Ways*, in which he highlighted the value of aesthetic art that philosophically imitates the connective harmony between subjectivity and nature. "The establishment of aesthetics based on the subjectivity of mental powers was the beginning of a dangerous process of domestication. Undoubtedly, the determining factor was, as Kant saw it, the secret harmony existing between the beauty of nature and the subjectivity of the self... The establishment of aesthetics inevitably leads to a fundamental domestication in the fertile development of the principle of liberating genius from rules. Art, which no longer draws from the all-encompassing totality of the system of existence, becomes opposed to actual existence and the raw reality of life. The enlightening power contained in poetry succeeds in reconciling art and actual existence only within its own aesthetic world."(Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 233)

The concept of taste in classical philosophy was often limited primarily to moral thought, a feature that marked the works of classical philosophers, especially the Enlightenment thinkers. Its semantic significance in its manifestations was rational, and at other times, in its intellectual loftiness, tended toward dogmatism. "This concept describes an ideal of authentic humanity, acquiring its character from the effort to adopt a critical stance toward the dogmatism of scholastic tendencies, and only later became confined to the aesthetic aspect."(Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 89)

Similarly, in Gadamer's conception, taste became more characterized by an aesthetic nature rather than an ethical one, a direction also followed by some thinkers such as Schleiermacher, Gracián, and others. Considering the impact of art and its reflection on the interpretive artistic truth, the resonance of interpretive truth extends beyond the limits of reason, delving into the depths of profound consciousness. Here, taste is a marker of the peculiarity of truth in the artist (the interpreter). Taste, closely linked to interpretation, does not concern itself with the common nature's impulses such as common sense or spontaneous actions; rather, taste is a rational rooting filled with imagination and the aesthetics of dynamic ideas. For this reason, rationalists attributed it more to reason than to its effect on our senses. Perhaps this is what Gracián meant when he acknowledged that "the sense of taste, which is more animalistic and internal than our other senses, still involves the beginnings of rational discernment, which we form from the judgment of things. Thus, the sensory discernment of taste, which instantaneously decides acceptance or rejection, is unparalleled—not merely instinct, but it achieves a balance between sensory instinct and intellectual freedom... Accordingly, Gracián views taste as imparting spirituality to animality, and rightly points out that there is not only education (Cultura) of

reason (*Ingenio*) but also of taste (*Gusto*), which is the starting point in Gracián's example of social cultivation." (Hans-Georg, 2006)

Interpretive research has meanings and objectives that philosophers of the era have devoted themselves to defining, outlining its frameworks and contexts. Through this, reason was inspired to refine concepts and mobilize their semantic content, in accordance with the requirements of intellectual and systemic evaluation, within the limits established by historical understanding and consciousness, following the mechanisms of historical criticism.

"The meaning of interpretive research is the revelation of the miracle of understanding, not the revelation of the wondrous communication between selves. Understanding is participation in collective intention... What we share with the heritage to which we belong determines our imagined ideas and guides our understanding." (Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 42)

It is worth noting that Gadamer's philosophy of consciousness does not view its structures and founding conditions in opposition to its contradictory theses. "It is necessary that consciousness be realized in its long-established prejudgments and its current assumptions. Without this purification, the light we receive from historical consciousness is but a veiled and useless light; without it, our knowledge of the other historically is nothing but reductions." (Hans-Georg, 2006) The intentionality of understanding, within the manifestations of consciousness, is a continuously renewed discourse that takes on newly created teleological paths. One of its streams directs interpretive discourse toward universality and globality, as the concept of unity finds its place in our dialogues, requiring expressive (linguistic) agreement and logical coherence, followed by a comprehensive understanding of historical issues that are the subject of dispute, dialogue, and debate. "If we follow the model of the art of interpretation, we find that every effort toward understanding seeks possible consensus, and this effort must itself be based on agreement that connects us to what we understand and agree upon... If there is nothing that binds us (to the things we agree on), then dialogue tends to fail. For this reason, ideological critique must integrate rational discourse as a decisive issue that enables us to communicate without embarrassment." (Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 95)

3-The Stakes of Hermeneutic Discourse in the Research of Human Sciences:

When it comes to studying or discussing issues and problems in the human sciences—what Dilthey calls the historical sciences or the sciences of the spirit—we often encounter doubt, complexity, and confusion masked by intertwinement and ambiguity. This is why the topics of the sciences of the spirit have been the subject of dispute and debate throughout modern and contemporary times. The matter became even more complicated due to Gadamer's approach—and that of his contemporaries, such as Heidegger, Schleiermacher, and others—to the problem of interpretation. I call it a problem because clarity has remained elusive. Amid the contradictions of the discourse and the conflict of assumptions and hypotheses among specialists in the human sciences, challenges arise regarding the reality and ontology of interpretation, with its initial limit being possibility and its ultimate nature being actualization and real activation. Our hermeneutic equation is derived from the question of hermeneutics in the human sciences.

Dilthey (1833–1911), in the nineteenth century, specifically addressed the social sciences with groundbreaking propositions that went beyond epistemic philosophical theses. His foundational research assumption was the acknowledgment of a distinction between the fields of inquiry in the natural sciences versus the fields of inquiry in the sciences of the spirit. Dilthey sees "hermeneutics as the foundation of all spiritual sciences... that is, the humanities and social sciences—those branches of research that undertake the interpretation of expressions of the inner life of humans, whether these expressions are gestures, historical actions, codified laws, or works of art or literature." (Adel, 2017, p. 66) Understanding is the approach of the human sciences, and interpretation is the approach of the natural sciences—thus believed Dilthey. Understanding is the most distinctive feature of the human being's action and reaction when presenting their readings on subjects, or when engaging in discourse or dialogue with other selves. In Dilthey's words: "Understanding is the term given to the process by which

mental life becomes known through the folds of its expressions given to the senses.” (Salah, 2007, p. 176)

The matter differs from the natural sciences because the fundamental fact in the human sciences is not that certain subjects and processes in the world of ordinary experience are perceived as existing and occurring in a known place and time, but rather as arising from a mental life that is its expression and manifestation. Growth surrounds the dynamics of consciousness, which is capable of awareness that achieves true understanding of human finitude in a world extended through its historical articulations. There is no doubt that “the emergence of historical consciousness is undoubtedly the important revolution we have witnessed since the advent of the modern era; its spiritual significance likely surpasses the meaning we assign to the achievements of the natural sciences, which have clearly transformed our planet... By historical consciousness, we mean the privilege of modern humans who possess awareness of the historicity of every present and the relativity of all opinions.” (Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 147) Since the human sciences are historical sciences, what truly defines their subjects is their comprehensiveness and the multiplicity of their sources, as they extend deeply into heritage and the richness of social and cultural life. Accordingly, interpretation is concerned with the insight into heritage and the induction of its ideas for the purpose of understanding humans, centering around this interrelated multiplicity and overall unity. “The awareness we currently possess of history differs from the way the past appeared previously to a people or a certain era. By historical consciousness, we mean the privilege of modern humans: those who possess awareness of the historicity of every present and the relativity of all opinions. It is clear at all times that grasping historical consciousness does not occur without leaving an impact on the intellectual activity of our contemporaries: consider the great spiritual upheavals that our era has witnessed.” (Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 147) Likewise, Gadamer believed that the human sciences, unlike the natural sciences, do not possess scientific status as much as they draw from philosophy their problems and methods of inquiry. “If the human sciences form specific connections with philosophy, it is not only from a purely epistemological perspective; they do not merely pose a problem to philosophy, but rather they pose a philosophical problem itself.”

“All that we can address regarding their logical and epistemological status, or their epistemological independence from the natural sciences, is a straightforward matter if we consider the essence and purely philosophical significance of them.” (Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 147) Understanding, in its deep meanings (archaeological, anthropological, historical, theological, and others), is employed in philosophical and scientific research particularly to grasp the need for its methodological and semantic elevation, as an alternative way to reveal truth, away from any mythologizing or self-interested subjectivism. This comes after hermeneutic understanding has severed its ties with previous understandings, which it neither coexisted with nor could epistemically develop, because it has become a comprehensive grasp of the epistemic levels emerging from the depth of life, or rather from the depth of our understanding of the experience of life and the complexities of lived experiences in the present—experiences that arise from growth and creation emerging from the womb of historical consciousness.

“Human studies must deepen the insight of public opinion and make it organized if they are to achieve a principal structure of objective knowledge about humans... Understanding is not only an unavoidable cognitive process through which we can know the facts of human studies, but it is also our means of interpreting these facts... The use of human knowledge based on understanding meaning is the main characteristic of all human studies, and it places us before specific challenges and special opportunities.” (Rickman, 1979, pp. 318–320)

Despite the strenuous efforts exerted by those responsible for the affairs and problems of the humanities, the ambition of the current challenge remains their main concern and routine. Interpretation and understanding have been a matter different from hermeneutics; the challenge lies in purposeful methodological or systemic renewals and transformations, followed by accurate verifications and selections of mechanisms and research strategies in their fields. This is what Gadamer meant when he said: “We expect from the human and social sciences the same sovereignty enjoyed by the human and social world. We expect more from the humanities, especially if we consider that the ongoing dominance of nature plays a major role in intensifying the boredom and narrowness we experience today more than diminishing them... We expect from the humanities to grant us a different pattern and

level of knowledge, and this also applies to the philosophy encompassed by these sciences."(Hans-Georg, 2006, pp. 159-160)

The time has come to sever our ties with the so-called historicism, where we find no justifications for truth. Truth is something we penetrate through its light into the heart of history, where heritage resides, flowing into our selves as awareness. "To listen to heritage and to belong to its space—that, it seems, is the path to the truth that should be sought in the humanities. Any critique of heritage that we can perform as historians can only connect us to the true heritage to which we already belong. Being conditioned (by this heritage) does not constitute an obstacle to historical knowledge but rather represents the very moment of truth itself... What we know through history is ultimately ourselves. Knowledge in the humanities is linked to self-knowledge."(Hans-Georg, 2006, p. 165)

Conclusion

Until recently, the hallmark of the humanities was complexity, ambiguity, and subjectivism, until the announcement of a genuine beginning of progressive revolutionary stability revealed the capacity of reason to overcome epistemic obstacles that had hindered the progressive developmental trajectory in the fields of human and social research. There is no doubt that the hermeneutic school demonstrated the emergence of the contours of accessing truth through methods of understanding and interpretation, as an alternative to approaches whose temporal and spatial validity had expired. This opened the way for critical evaluative studies that had a significant impact by dispelling the illusions of the past, the impressions of subjective selves, and the myths of knowledge deeply rooted in the absurd dogmatism of humanity's knowledge history. Gadamerian hermeneutics here revealed a creative, luminous insight that combined the quality of research, imbued with the boldness of critique shining from a rational source that restored meaning to understanding. It revealed the requirements of truth, its coherence criteria, and the mechanisms of its attainment. In general, hermeneutic truth is a truth about humans as consciousness, history, and heritage in its spatiotemporal finitude. Within its texts, the quality of archaeological, historical, philosophical, and scientific research harmonizes within the relative transformations of the current philosophical and scientific revolutions.

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