

RESEARCH ARTICLE	The Algerian Liberation Revolutionary Movement between Challenges and Achievements 1939-1954	
Ghedjati Badra	Doctor	
	University of Algiers 2 Abou El Kassem Saadallah	
	Algeria	
	Email Id: badra.ghedjati@univ-alger2.dz	
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Abstract		
This study aims to highlight the continuity of the Algerian liberation revolutionary movement through its struggle within the Algerian People's Party and up to the revolutionary current that bore the historical responsibility for the outbreak of the Al-Fateh Revolution from November 1954. the liberation revolutionary movement is a revolution in the full sense of this term. A human entity that was able to form a distinct and advanced model of liberation, which is the political and organizational expression of the dynamic of the free Algerian people.		
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## 1. Introduction:

The liberation battle in Algeria was associated with a group of young people rebelling against French colonialism. Due to the large number of events that took place in the period before the start of direct armed action on the first of November 1954, the basic picture in which we follow the development of this issue was determined, and we realize its historical biography, and it shows us that the liberation revolution did not emerge from nothing, but from the determination of the first generation of Algerian revolutionary patriots active in the Algerian national movement with a revolutionary tendency, and showed us the extent to which the roots of armed struggle are firmly rooted in Algeria, by forming the first secret revolutionary cells, which preferred the effectiveness of this revolutionary current is mortgaged. By his ability to prove the integrity of his project and the degree of his readiness for armed action against the French occupation. The revolutionary current emerged from the womb of the Algerian national movement, believes in the principle of "what was taken by force is recovered by force", began to prepare in an

actual way for a real armed revolution against French colonialism, does not believe in political struggle, especially after the failures of the national movement during its struggle to establish parties, submit petitions and write slogans that brought Algeria to a dead end without obtaining the desired goals... - The success of the thesis of the revolutionary movement during the historical course of the Algerian liberation struggle. This study aims to highlight the historical and revolutionary dimension of the Algerian national movement, which bequeathed its experiences to the generation of the liberation revolution and to know the traditions of the struggle that inspired it and to prove that the Algerian revolution extends its roots in the depths of the past as the importance of the study lies in highlighting the extent of the success of the Algerian revolutionary current in preparing for the revolution and that its victory did not come by chance, but as a result of its association with the revolutionary liberation movement before it. As for the study methodology, we relied on the "historical method" because the field of study is "history", in addition to the "descriptive approach" to narrate events and facts, in the light of the testimonies

of the actors in the events through their personal memoirs, and we also relied on some academic scientific studies in the general and private scientific framework of the subject of study.

## **2. Signs of revolutionary activity and the beginnings of liberation consciousness in the Algerian national movement:**

### **2.1 The secret revolutionary cells of the Algerian People's Party during the Second World War 1939-1945:**

The French colonial authorities dissolved the Algerian People's Party (PPA) on September 26, 1939, imprisoning the majority of its leaders and deporting some of them to the camps, stopping its activities and restricting its militants, not to mention the violent methods it applied to deter any attempt or political activity that was intended to liberate the country and demand independence. The circumstances created by the Second World War and the failure of the reformist movement, France left the members of the Algerian People's Party only the option of secret struggle as a solution to confront its repressive policy ..(Chikh, 2002, p. 58)

A new generation of activists of the Algerian People's Party, belonging to the revolutionary current, worked hard to create a secret political force capable of fighting for independence. They began to form some secret cells and established a central committee, and this new leadership had to embark on a deep organizational activity, prepare for a new phase and coordinate the secret work, so the principles of secret organization were applied more strictly. In his memoirs, the mujahid Ahmed Mahsas points out that the militants who joined the Algerian People's Party after 1939 differ from the militants before in that they have the political maturity and revolutionary awareness that allows them to face the current situation of Algeria. So conscription into the party became more assertive and militant work became more selective ..(Mahssas, 2007, p. 183)

The Germans adopted a special strategy against the Allies by exploiting Arab nationalism in the struggle against the enemy, working on the prevailing psychology in the Maghreb countries, especially in Algeria, and supporting their national demands. The Germans aimed to form regular units tasked with fighting in North Africa, which played an important political and propaganda role. Germany formed the German-Arab Liaison Unit, part of the 68th Special Task Force of the Bundeswehr, which moved its headquarters to Tunisia to form the nucleus for recruiting Arab volunteers, but its use as a tool of Reich policy in North Africa hindered Allied activity ..(Lokaz, 2015, p. 391)

It should be noted that some historical sources chronicle the period 1939-1945 of Algeria's revolutionary

history, the spread of the phenomenon of the possession, popularity and possession of weapons by Algerians, especially the militants of the radical independence movement of the Algerian national movement. Mr. Ben Youssef Ben Khedda stated that some of these militants were in the Algerian People's Party (P.P.A.), and after their participation in the French wars in Asia and Europe, they began to think about armed action and develop a revolutionary consciousness ..(kheda, 2012, p. 115) In the same context, the mujahid and militant Hussein Ait Ahmed mentions in his memoirs that the Algerians are militants of the Algerian People's Party in the period of World War II, and during the landing of the Allies in Algeria in November 1942, they formed secret gangs to attack the convoys of the Allies in the area between Lakhdaria and Bouira, rob train cars and seize weapons and ammunition boxes .. (Ahmed, 2002, p. 140)

In the same context, some sources refer to the activities of some militants in the Algerian People's Party, in the field of smuggling and arms trafficking, which were available in abundance in both the Tunisian and Libyan borders from the warehouses of World War II, so the arms trade in Algeria was remarkably popular. On the same subject, the activist "Mohamed Yousfi" mentions in his testimony that the weapons caches were distributed in open places so that they are easy for Algerians to reach and even ammunition was available without guarding them, and adds that the Allied soldiers took advantage of the Algerians' need for weapons and smuggled weapons to the Algerians in exchange for money ..(MOUHAMED Y. , 1987, p. 19)

The eyes of Germany, the traditional enemy of France, turned to North African countries before the Anglo-American landings in Algeria, and the "German Reich" was able to follow a propaganda policy. The German consul to Algeria developed new propaganda directives, which included a huge propaganda effort, represented in radio and flyers, the well-known template for Nazi attacks on the Allies, and a plan was developed to deny all the statements of the Allies regarding the independence of the Maghreb countries and to draw the attention of its people that it was subject to deception, and the need for an armed revolution against occupied France ..(Lokaz, 2015, p. 373)

The "German Reich" was able to monitor the movements of the revolutionary patriots of the militants of the Algerian People's Party, they contacted the militant "Hajj Dahmani" working as a merchant in Germany, the latter contacted the militants "Rajef Belkacem" and "Mohamed Rabouh" who are in Paris. The three traveled to Germany in complete secrecy without informing the party leaders, and met with representatives of the "Reich", an employee of the German Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs, a lengthy dialogue took place between the two parties, the Algerian party intervened,

saying: "We are members of a party demanding Algerian independence... The Algerian people oppose French colonialism but are not ready for war yet... We can be your allies... We ask for military assistance to liberate our country and train our party's militants for the upcoming armed struggle," adds Rajef Belkacem: "We found out that the Germans are ready to receive Algerians for military training ".(kheda, 2012, p. 116)

The revolutionary patriots of the People's Party did not give up despite the obstacles to obtaining weapons and military training to make their revolutionary project a success .(Sarry Djilali, 1987, p. 70) In this context, Mr. Ben Youssef Ben Khadda mentions that these activists in the People's Party were able to form a group called the "Talib" group, where a delegation of them moved to Germany in 1939, the group was able to obtain some military training such as the use of military technology, and know how to blow up bridges, make bombs, and use individual weapons ..(Mhfoud, 2008, p. 884)

In the spring of 1939, the Taleb group formed the "North African Revolutionary Committee" (CARNA), its members are: (Muhammad Talib, Omar Hamza, Amara Rashid, Abdul Rahman Jens, Ahmed Fleita, Muqdes Lakhdar, and Ali Zawi), and a delegation of them went to Germany and stayed in Berlin in a luxury hotel, the members of the delegation were very carefully briefed and were taught some basic principles on how to use individual weapons and manufacture explosives and were trained in techniques for disabling the engines of military machines ..(kheda, 2012, p. 120)

From the foregoing, it became clear to us that the goal of the Revolutionary North African Committee is to go to Germany . In the spring of 1939, the Taleb group formed the "North African Revolutionary Committee" (CARNA), its members are: (Muhammad Talib, Omar Hamza, Amara Rashid, Abdul Rahman Jens, Ahmed Fleita, Muqdes Lakhdar, and Ali Zawi), and a delegation of them went to Germany and stayed in Berlin in a luxury hotel, the members of the delegation were very carefully briefed and were taught some basic principles on how to use individual weapons and manufacture explosives and were trained in techniques for disabling the engines of military machines. It is the search for an ally to help them break free from French colonialism. In particular, it was reported in some sources that some members of the Commission inside the country were able to obtain and collect some weapons, which were available in open places, some of them unguarded, and were stored in secret ways away from the sight of the French authorities.

In 1940, France was defeated by the German army, boosted morale and strengthened the patriotic passions of the People's Party militants, so the Politburo studied the possibility of creating a secret army and presented the project to the party leaders ..(Sarry Djilali, 1987, p.

72)With these new developments, the members of the North African Revolutionary Committee met again and decided to re-establish contact with the Germans through the German Commission for the Implementation of Armistice Measures in North Africa, which was based in Algiers. The activists "Ouamara Rashid" and "Mohamed Abdoun" were assigned this task, headed Monday to the Ambassador Hotel, the headquarters of the "German Committee" and set them an appointment in one of the city's cafes. But the German side was not on time .(kheda, 2012, p. 121)

There is no doubt that this disappointment did not stop the determination of the revolutionary Algerian youth, as the Algerian party resumed its contacts with the "Italian Ceasefire Commission" through an employee of the Italian consulate called "Diavolo" and the meeting between the two parties took place at the house of a well-known figure in the capital Algiers called "Sayed Ahmed Mustafa Pasha", the Algerians asked for Italy's help with weapons, but the Italians refused and only made promises. The Italian position was very similar to that of the Germans before them .(Mhfoud, 2008, p. 885)

In the midst of these circumstances and the lack of material support, the leaders of the North African Revolutionary Committee decided to devote all their efforts to establishing a strong and solid organization, but this time more organized and rigorous. At the beginning of 1943, the members met and agreed to establish a new organization, known in historical writings as the "Rashad" school and its prominent members (Muhammad Talib, Hassan Assala, Hamo Boutlelis, Jamal Dardour, Chadli al-Makki, and Hajj Hussein). Through which they were able to organize military action, through popular mobilization, where many young people enthusiastic for revolutionary work were recruited in many areas of the country, and secret cells specialized in collecting weapons and ammunition were formed ..(Mouhamed A. , 1992, p. 99)

Of course, the release of a large number of militants on April 26, 1943, led to the creation of new divisions distributed within the country, including the Algerian Islamic Scouts (SMA), an organization that quickly grew from August 1943. In the same context, the muja-hid Abdessalam Habashi mentions that among the patriotic young men who had a military project against the French occupation, is the young man "Mohamed Bouras", where he embodied the formation of Algerian youth and preparing him for armed struggle, within the scout structures and allocated hours for paramilitary training ..(Habachi, 2008, p. 80) Commander Mohamed Bouras was able to travel to France, where he had contacts with German intelligence, which asked them to provide him with weapons in order to launch armed action against French colonialism. But the French authorities realized his project and upon his

return to Algeria, he was arrested and executed along with a group of his comrades on May 29, 1941, on charges of collaborating with the Nazis ..(Mouhamed E. , 2005, p. 51)

In the midst of these circumstances and within the framework of individual secret armed action, the militant "Saleh Bouraa" founded a revolutionary party active in the field of collecting and smuggling weapons from the barracks of the French army, such as the barracks "Kasbah" in Constantine and the distribution of revolutionary leaflets, and was able to collect a significant amount of weapons, especially light ones, and were stored in secret places, and the party was able to spread liberal and revolutionary ideas in the middle of his region, but the colonial authorities discovered it, launched a campaign of arrests, which led him to He fled and did not return to revolutionary activity until after the outbreak of the revolution of November 1, 1954, where he joined the revolution and struggled with weapons until he was martyred. This is in addition to numerous attempts by revolutionary activists from the People's Party throughout the country ..(Mouhamed E. , 1985, p. 197)

Among the secret cells with military activity, who were members of the scout movement, a group of young people were able to establish a committee known as the "Belcourt Youth Committee" led by the young activist "Mohamed Belouizdad .."(Mahssas, 2007, p. 226) He adds in the same context the militant Mohamed Yousfi that in the spring of 1944 was assigned by the committee he and the militant Ahmed Mahsas the task of searching and seizing light weapons, and was located in the Anglo-American camps, and a tight plan was seized a group of weapons including pistols, grenades and a set of machine guns, and weapons were tested in the forest "bows" in the capital and called this process "recovery .."(yousfy mouhamed, 2002, p. 38)

The Algerian People's Party became the majority current in the Algerian national movement, as its revolutionary thesis swept a large number of activists even from other parties such as the Ahbab al-Bayan Party and the Association of Muslim Scholars, after all ways failed to convince France to grant independence to the Algerians. Reports of the French intelligence services, dated April 1945, indicated the existence of an Algerian plot to trigger a full-scale armed revolt, devised by elements of the Algerian People's Party, which led the French authorities to increase their arbitrary policy against the people. French sources reported in May 1945 that members of the Algerian People's Party had managed to collect a quantity of weapons by the end of World War II, and set up secret hideouts in many areas of the country ..(Elkassem, 1992, p. 254)

## 2.2The repercussions of the events of May 1945 on the revolutionary activity of the Algerian liberation movement:

The leadership of the Algerian People's Party took the initiative in the first of May 1945 to organize mass demonstrations across the national territory in coordination with the Ahbab Al-Bayan Party to recall the promises of the Allies, especially France, represented in the right of the people to self-determination. The slogans carried by the Algerian demonstrators included independence Release Messali al-Hajj, the party's leader, and other political prisoners. The largest of these demonstrations were in the major cities (Algeria, Bejaia, Oran, and Blida). The reaction of the French authorities is to shoot at the demonstrators, wounding many Algerians and activists of the People's Party, including "Mezghena and Hussein Assala", and this increased the enthusiasm of Algerian patriots, to reorganize other demonstrations throughout the country and the historic day was May 08, 1945 ..(Hechmawi mostafa, p. 63)

The Algerian people went out in peaceful demonstrations, but the shock was when the French army militias, charged with the humiliation they received at the hands of the Germans, emptied a barrage of bullets on unarmed Algerian citizens, and the defeated military police supported them to vent their soul, they were firing relentlessly and aimlessly, fearing that the crowds of demonstrators would defeat him as the Germans defeated him. Mujahid Abdelkader Laamoudi mentions in his testimony that the French army met the crowds with bullets, as he was hit by the hysteria of killing, and the result was the fall of tens of thousands of Algerian martyrs, estimated according to statistics at more than 45 thousand martyrs, and the destruction of thousands of homes and the arrest of many politicians and everyone related to the party and politics ..(Elkader, p. 122)

All historical sources agree that the events of May 1945 will strongly influence the development of the Algerian revolutionary movement within the Algerian People's Party, strengthen the idea of national unity, and establish the principle that violence is the necessary response to French colonial policy. The events of May 1945 greatly influenced the leadership of the People's Party and created a real crisis between supporters and opponents of armed action, and the possibility of armed confrontation with the colonial power became an inevitable necessity for many Algerian nationalists .The leaders of the Algerian People's Party (PPA) aspired to escalate the revolutionary tide to the Maghreb countries and aimed to establish a united front at the level of North Africa, with the aim of demanding the independence of the three Maghreb countries. The militant Ben Youssef Ben Khadda mentions that a delegation of the leaders of the People's Party, "Mohamed Lamine Dabbaghine" and "Mubarak Filali", traveled to Tunisia



secretly, and then they were joined by Chadli Mekki, who had taken refuge in the Tunisian capital in May 1945. And call the President of Al-Zaytouna Mosque was "Al-Fadil Ben Achour", then Mr. "Klibi" and lawyer "Hassan Kalati", and they were able to contact two members of the New Destourian Party from the political bureau, "Mongi Slim" and "Allal Belhouan". The two agreed to the proposals of the Algerian People's Party and promised to carry out armed operations in southern Tunisia and organize strikes in the north to pressure the French authorities and express their rejection of their arbitrary policy in Algeria. (kheda, 2012, p. 151)

The same Algerian delegation also went to the Moroccan brothers, and through the city of Tlemcen, "Mohamed Lamine Dabbaghine" and "Falali" infiltrated inside a cargo transport vehicle and crossed the border to the city of Casablanca, and there they met "Mehdi Ben Barka", one of the leaders of the Istiqlal Party, who brought them together with "Ahmed Belfrij", "Omar Ben Jelloul" and "Mohamed Ben Nasser", the official of the Oujda region, the talks were very difficult because the Moroccans had a view, which is that the independence of Algeria is difficult by virtue of the fact that it French settlement. Finally, they approved and signed the document of cooperation between the three Moroccan parties (the Algerian People's Party represented by Mohamed Lamine Dabbaghine, the Tunisian Neo-Destourian Party represented by Mongi Slim and Allal Belhouane, and the Moroccan Istiqlal Party represented by Ben Nasser Mohamed) and the document included: Prepare for a joint operation at the level of North Africa aimed at granting independence to the three countries, including resorting to armed action. However, this document remained a dead letter, and the initiative failed because both the Tunisian and Moroccan sides violated the agreement not to enter into formal negotiations with the French authorities. However, the two parties negotiated many times with the French authorities without informing the PP, leaving the PP with no choice but to continue its struggle alone to prepare for armed action against French colonialism. Ben Youssef Ben Khadda mentions that the text of the tripartite agreement met the same fate as the documents of the Algerian People's Party, most of which were lost, and the only hope of finding that document is to refer to the archives of the two parties in the two brotherly countries Tunisia and Morocco. (kheda, 2012, p. 152)

During this period, Messali El Hajj went to the Levant to ask for help in preparing for armed action in Algeria. But he received little support from Arab leaders. Except from the Saudi King and the Secretary-General of the Arab League, "Abdul Rahman Azzam", who agreed with his idea, and to make it real, he contacted Mr. Ben Youssef bin Khadda and asked him to prepare a group of young men to direct them to Cairo to receive mili-

tary training and prepare for the day of the declaration of the armed revolution. (Hechmawi mostafa, p. 65) According to the source available to us, Ben Youssef Ben Khadda, he did not say whether he actually prepared the young men or not, as he kept the matter mysterious and did not say the difficulties he faced about it.

To be sure, the PPP has completely changed its plans and policies, and the leadership is more mature and politically aware than before. In the same context, the militant Mr. Mohamed Boudiaf adds that the Algerian People's Party has become the movement to which the hopes of Algerians were attached, in order to achieve the desired independence, and for this reason the processes of joining the ranks of the People's Party began in abundance, as a large number of young people returning from the Second World War, most of them from the cities and villages of the interior, joined the party, and their arrival displaced the traditional framework inherent in the cities and the capital, and highlighted more rigid trends aimed at establishing a more solid armed organization and a stronger structure and provider. with a revolutionary plan. (Boudiaf, 2001, p. 15)

After the radical current within the Algerian People's Party failed to rely on military aid with weapons and ammunition from abroad, and its failure to blow up the comprehensive revolution, some of its members were arrested and imprisoned. Other elements that have been spared the pursuits of the French authorities have decided to reorganize themselves, and rely on their own capabilities, by forming new revolutionary elements and providing money and weapons to blow up the armed revolution, and here we refer to individual operations such as those carried out by some national revolutionary militants returning from forced conscription and who took advantage of the recruitment period in training to carry weapons and try to smuggle them from barracks, such as: Souidani Boujemaa and Didouche Mourad, like Mustapha Ben Boulaid and Mohamed Belouizdad, who were carrying out operations to collect weapons and urged citizens to store them until the time for their use. (Mouhamed A. , 1991, p. 40)

We refer to the operation carried out by "Larbi Ben M'hidi", which is the theft of two pistols from the Ouar-gla barracks, where he was a worker. In another operation, the fighter Souidani Boujemaa after being called for compulsory conscription in 1944 collected weapons from the remnants of World War II, if you will benefit from the relationship he established with one of the Algerian soldiers and agreed with the latter to smuggle some pieces of weapons from the barracks and some money, and indeed the soldier smuggled a set of weapons in two batches (02 Mat 49 pistols and 120 cartridges), and in the third attempt was exposed, the French

authorities tracked the movements of Souidani Boujemaa until revealed His weapons cache inside the stable of the Belaid Ali family in a popular neighborhood He was arrested and sentenced to 18 months in prison on September 19, 1946 .(Chetwan, 2019, p. 33).

Tunisia was a natural refuge for Algerians to bring in arms at this stage. Mujahid Ammar Qalil recalls that many Algerians in villages, especially and rural areas, living on the Algerian-Tunisian border, were in possession of significant quantities of weapons, obtained from Tunisian arms smugglers and dealers. Between 1943-1945, the French services in charge of surveillance operations were able to seize about 80,000 war rifles and nearly 3,000 automatic rifles, and perhaps the Algerians' demand for these weapons is due to their low price, which did not exceed one thousand francs per piece ..(Guelil, 1991, p. 235)

Among the eastern border regions that were instrumental in arming the Algerians was the Oued Righ region, which was an important stop for commercial caravans coming from north to south, then towards Tunisia and Libya to Central Africa. Due to its location close to the border, it was a storage place for weapons that came from Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, and were later transported by train linking Touggart and Biskra to the regions of Mashounesh and Aures by a network of militants active in the purchase and transport of weapons ..(Mnassria, 1999, p. 134)

After the end of World War II, Algeria witnessed a boom in the arms trade at the hands of some people who specialized in the field and the names of many markets were associated with this trade, such as Souk al-Khamis near the village of "Ait Khazoune" in the Azrou roundabout, which is administratively affiliated to the mixed municipality of Soummam. In addition to the Bani Sadaqa market in the same area, where weapons were sold for a tenth or a double tenth .(Djabli, 2013, p. 30)

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Arms smuggling operations started from the Aures region, where it witnessed widespread activity, especially in 1947, and exactly on the eastern border from Tebessa, the Eurasians who actually rely on the passion of the inhabitants of the region for firearms, and have made it a real trade, with processions of four to six

camels, and the transfer of weapons purchased in Libya and Tunisia from Italian stockpiles, about four times a year, as about three hundred weapons enter the Eurasian region every season, many of which are recovered by the French authorities. Following quarrels or some crimes or following a whistleblowing by some residents loyal to the French authority .(MOUHAMED, 2011, p. 41)

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The leaders of the party called the organization the name of the "special organization" or "brain" or "OS", a paramilitary organization, with a strict hierarchical organization, based on the principle of secret work, its main task is the technical preparation of the armed revolution and the formation of specialized cadres, to turn in time into the launching pad of the revolution, and then direct the masses of party militants and revolutionaries in the future, was at the top of the pyramid of the organization "General Staff" national responsibility, determined its original structure after its first meeting held on November 13, 1947 at the house of the head of the organization Mohammed Belouizdad .(Mahssas, 2007, p. 294)

The organization's staff was composed of Mohamed Belouizdad (coordinator), Hocine Ait Ahmed (political official), Jilali Belhadj (military official) and officials in charge of the prefectures, as Algeria was divided into five prefectures whose leadership was entrusted to five officials: Marouk Mohamed (prefecture of the city of Algiers), Mohamed Digimi (prefecture of Central Algeria and Mitija), Mohamed Boudiaf (prefecture of Constantine), Ait Ahmed (prefecture of Kabylie) and (prefecture of Oran) of Ahmed Ben Bella. Two other members of the National General Staff Command are: M'hamed Yousfi, in charge of public services, and Hadj Abdelkader, in charge of this military training in 1947 ..(Boudiaf, 2001, p. 35)

The General Staff met in 1948 after the death of its president, Mohamed Belouizdad, and there was a change in its structure after it became responsible for it Hussein Ait Ahmed and became (center) the responsibility of Ahmed Mahsas and Jilali Raqimi, either (Kabylie) was assigned to Ould Hamouda and Omar Boudaoud, then (East and North Constantine) to Mo-

hamed Boudiaf, Larbi Ben Mhidi and Didouche Mourad, either (Oran sector) to Hammou Bou Tlililes, Ben Said Abdel Rahman and Lourioui Rabeh .(yousfy mouhamed, 2002, p. 110)

It should be noted that the rules of procedure of the Special Organization have been applied in the so-called cluster system, which is a strict system based on strict confidentiality. The late Mujahid Mohamed Boudiaf mentions that "the structure of the base at the organizational level consists of half a regiment of fighters, two and the head of half of the regiment, then half of two regiments form a regiment, which means  $3 + 3 + 1$  head of the regiment, i.e. 7 militants, and above the regiment there is a division that consists of two regiments headed by the head of the division, a total of 15 fighters. Then above it is the village formed of several sections, and each half of a regiment carries out a separate activity from the rest of the halves from the other regiments .. (KAFI, 1999, p. 35)

Based on our historical sources, the Special Organization achieved positive results at the beginning of its establishment in 1947, especially in the matter of weapons collection, as it obtained a significant stock of weapons through the purchase of Libyan and Tunisian traders on the black market, as well as from smuggling hunting rifles, pistols and ammunition belonging to the remnants of the Second World War and placing them in secret hideouts. According to some testimonies of the mujahideen, the quantity was estimated at about 300 different weapons in several diverse and successful operations. In the same context, the jihadist Mohamed Seddiqi mentions that the secret smuggling of weapons to Algeria began when the Algerian People's Party approved the establishment of the special organization, adding that these supplies were weak given the political conditions surrounding Algeria, so the roads to Tunisia and Libya, which were under colonial punishment, were not easy to walk. However, the Algerian People's Party tried to buy some of the light weapons left behind by the Italians in southern Tunisia and Libya. Some of these weapons were confiscated as dated by the document issued by the French government in the southern region of Togart No. 341/E.M.I.S. in October 1947. It states that (on October 2 it was confiscated in AD ... (Sdiki, 1986, p. 23)

One of the most important armaments carried out during this period was two successful operations by purchasing weapons from Libya. The first was in 1947 by commander Mohamed Belouizdad, who handed over 300,000 francs to the militant Ahmed Melody and assigned him to buy weapons. The latter managed to go to Libya with Mohamed Belhaj, Bachir Ben Moussa, Abdelkader Laamoudi and Belkacem Adouka. A shipment of weapons estimated at 33 Italian-made individual semi-automatic rifles was purchased, these rifles were wrapped with mats, and this shipment was

transported in a bus belonging to a company owned by an Italian centenarian, the bus set off from the valley towards Biskra and there the shipment was received by Larbi Ben M'hidi and Al-Hashemi Al-Taroudi. They were transported to Constantine and stored there in a secret hideout belonging to the Arab militant Ben Knida. As for the second operation, it took place in 1948 and in the same way, where half a million French francs were allocated from the organization's budget for the purchase of weapons, and both Mohamed Boudiaf and Larbi Ben M'hidi were assigned to move to the area of "Ghadames" in Libya and buy a shipment of weapons estimated at 100 guns and ammunition, but this time it was transported by convoy. From the camels, Abdelkader Al-Amoudi received her in the suburbs of Biskra to be transported to the Aures and stored in Hamed's corral .(BACHIR, 1999) Mujahid Abd al-Salam Habashi disagrees on the quantity, saying: "125 Italian war rifles from World War II and several boxes of ammunition were acquired from Libya ".(Habachi, 2008, p. 108)

Some historical sources point to another method of supplying the organization with explosive materials for the manufacture of bombs such as "dynamite", which is the method of attacking mines and quarries, such as the operation "Al-Wanza", in which the elements of "Souidani Boujemaa" targeted a quarry belonging to the French colonization, and seized a large amount of explosives ..(Chetwan, 2019, p. 35) Another similar operation, mentioned by the Mujahid Abdelkader Al-Amoudi, in his testimony, is that there is another shipment of weapons obtained in 1948, from the Hassi Khalifa area near Oued Souf, and these weapons were represented in a quantity of explosives delivered to some people who were planting stone palm trees, which prompted the French authorities to hand over dynamite to those concerned, but the secret organization of the special organization worked to prepare fake nominal lists of people on the basis that they had benefited of the explosive and diverted dynamite to the Aures region .(Lamoudi, p. 32)

There is no doubt that the eastern region of Algeria has experienced similar operations. It was carried out by the leader of the special organization in the Souk Ahras region, the militant Badji Mokhtar. He launched commando operations against mines located in the Souk Ahras area, such as the Bernous mine and the Nador mine, in which he seized 480 explosive cartridges, explosives, a "Bakfour" fuse, a "Moser" weapon, a pistol, a compass and a sum of money estimated at 400,000 old French francs ..(Boubaker, 2016, p. 28)

The efforts of Mohamed Boudiaf, Larbi Ben Mhidi, Rabah Bitat, Didouche Mourad and Ben Toubal focused on activating the role of the organization for the region, working to support and expand its spread, and to give attention necessary for its personnel. As for the

Aures region, Mustapha Ben Boulaid took charge of it from Mohamed Boudiaf and immediately established secret cells belonging to the organization of "Aris", "Bouareif" and "Khenchela", and for this he mobilized all his capabilities to activate their role by motivating the militants of the secret cells at the level of the periphery of the Aures region to enter into actual supply operations in preparation for armed action ..(Hlayli, 2013, p. 31)

Mustapha Ben Boulaid was interested in the issue of weapons and the search for them, whether by buying them on the black market. Or the weapons available to the inhabitants of the region that they own in their homes or remnants of the Second World War, and store them in many secret hideouts in the region. Mustapha Ben Boulaid successfully conducted several armaments. In 1948, he personally supervised the arrival of the first load of weapons provided by Mohamed Belouizdad and hid them in safe places in the Aures Mountains. Thus, about 300 weapons are passed to the Aures region every month and stored in Auras, Souk Ahras and Oued Souf .(Laabidi, 1996)

What is worth mentioning is the type of weapons stored in the possession of Mustapha Ben Boulaid in the reports of one of the commanders of the French army in the region, it is mentioned that Ben Boulaid had some German and Italian weapons before the outbreak of the revolution, which were not recovered by the Allies after the end of the battles in Libya and Tunisia in 1942 and 1943. THESE WEAPONS INCLUDED A FEW DOZEN MAUSER RIFLES, SOME STATTI LIGHT RIFLES, AS WELL AS A LARGE NUMBER OF HUNTING RIFLES, SOME OLD-FASHIONED FRENCH ANKLES AND STERN MACHINE GUNS ..(Faral, 2008, p. 68)

At the beginning of its foundation, the leaders of the private organization relied on the revenues and contributions of its members and on the aid of the Movement for the Victory of Democratic Freedoms. In 1948, these revenues were halved, thus causing a financial imbalance, and on this basis a secret meeting of the Algerian People's Party, the Movement for the Victory of Democratic Freedoms and the private organization was held in December in the Zedine area of the wilaya of Ain Defla. At this meeting, it was decided to carry out covert operations in order to finance the private organization and buy weapons, and here the idea of attacking the Oran Post was proposed. Perhaps the only motive behind the idea was the significant shortfall in the organization's own budget, and the inability of the Movement for the Victory of Democratic Freedom to cover all its expenses, which made the financial situation of the organization deteriorate significantly. In the same context, Mr. Ahmed Ben Bella mentions in his testimony about the operation, that the idea of attacking the Oran post was proposed during the meeting of

Zedin, and immediately after that he was assigned a mission to the city of Oran and handed him the so-called Bakhti Nemnich, who was an employee of the Oran Post, the necessary information and the map of the building to prepare for this operation, and immediately a commando was formed by Hocine Ait Ahmed includes each of (Souidani Boujemaa, Belhaj Abdelkader, Bouchaib Ahmed, Ammar Haddad, Rabah Loughuoui, Mohamed Khider and Ben Zarqa) and went The Comandos immediately to the scene in Oran to carry out the secret offensive operation. (Benblla Ahmed, 2012)

On the same subject, the mujahid M'hamed Yousfi recalls that at dawn on April 5, 1949, the Comundus broke into the post office and seized with great difficulty the available money, and five minutes later the operation had been completed and the amount of the booty was estimated at 3,170,000 old French francs. Mohammad Khider delivered it in two batches to the leadership of the organization. The organization expected a larger amount from this operation, but the booty was much lower than expected, and the amount was allocated to the purchase of weapons and the training of the organization's own elements.. (yousfy mouhamed, 2002, p. 93)

Thus, the organization became in a good position and continued the training of its members, and those exercises were taking place in the ChercHELL area, and the Ain and Sarah area, because the two areas are suitable for landing weapons, and the members of the special organization continued to send their disciplinary messages to the French authorities, this time it was by trying to sabotage and blow up the statue of Prince Abdul Qadir, and the reason was the provocative phrase written by the French under the statue says: "If the Algerians listened to the words of this hero, they would remain friends with the French forever." But the sabotage attempt did not succeed as planned due to the poor quality of the explosives, the organization's operations continued and began to move and carry out many disciplinary actions in different regions.. (Hechmawi mostafa, p. 78)

During the Zeddin meeting, the organization's leaders focused on the need to activate activities such as the manufacture of explosives. The Engineering Department was established and was chosen to be based in the capital near May Square. It began training militants on tribal techniques and explosives, and for this purpose three workshops were established, the first in Algiers in a warehouse on Rufigo Street, the second in Hussein Dey, on the outskirts of the capital, and the third in the Kabylie region. Militants Ahmed Mahsas mentions that elements have been trained in the use of types of explosives in sabotage operations, and specialists have come to design and manufacture a type of hand grenades using some recovered materials such as plumb-



ing pipes and others, this type of explosives has become manufactured locally. The person in charge of these workshops was Mokran Arab.. (Bouzbid, 2007, p. 35)

In 1948 it became necessary to add a radio communication service and an intelligence department and submit the matter to the Politburo, and the first point was unanimously approved, while the second point was rejected, especially by Mr. Lamine Dabbaghin, fearing that the device would be misused and become a danger to the party. With regard to communications, the Information and Communications Section had been established with the task of training elements on the use of radios. The Section was organized into units with radio specialists involved in technical education, equipment manufacturing and maintenance. Activist Ahmed Mehsas recalls that the technician Ben Ammar was commissioned to manufacture a transmitter and receiver in one of the centers where this work was carried out located at 30 rue Rigoudi in Balcourt, Algiers . (Mahssas, 2007, p. 311)

As soon as 1949 ended, the organization completed its training and the training of its personnel, who were ready to engage in operations on the ground. However, the tasks were limited by the party's leadership's fear that the organization would be at risk of exposure, as well as out of the motive of preserving the party and avoiding its dissolution as before. The leadership warned the private organization against reckless declaration of revolution because of a conspiracy by the French authorities aimed at eliminating the party. The Organization is not ready to launch and the people are not prepared for armed revolution. It was at this time that the Movement for the Victory of Democratic Freedoms suffered from what was known as the barbaric crisis that ravaged the unity of the party. The confusion pervaded the elements of the special organization and the maintenance of the separation of the regiments began to become difficult little by little, and it was no longer possible to maintain the recruitment of militants, due to the lack of missions or any revolutionary activity ..(KAFL, 1999, p. 37)

### **2.3 Revolutionary patriots succeed in triggering the revolution and the birth of the National Liberation Army:**

Coinciding with the dissolution of the private organization and the trial of its members, and the images of resentment, despair and displacement that afflicted the surviving militants. New developments took place at the regional level of Algeria, and events took place in neighboring Tunisia and Morocco against the French colonial policy. In Tunisia, the French authorities carried out a wave of mass arrests of constitutional activists and prevented them from holding their congress. They subsequently launched several strikes, demonstrated and clashed with security forces because of the repression of the French authorities. When the area of "Ras

Boon" was subjected to a combing operation. All this led to an escalation of the political awareness of the struggle base in Tunisia to move to direct armed action against French colonialism ..(Mahssas, 2007, p. 350)

As for the Far Maghreb state, the events in Casablanca were enough to express the situation, as workers organized demonstrations over the killing of the activist "Farhat Hached", and the demonstrations turned into repression of abuse and killing, especially among the activists of the Istiqlal Party and preventing them from practicing their activities. Among the events that affected was the signing of the "North African Alliance" document by the national parties on February 2, 1952 in Paris. Their decision to establish a committee for unity and action, as it should be noted the revolution of the Free Officers in Egypt in July 1952. The outbreak of armed struggle in Tunisia and Morocco and the rise of liberation thought in the world had a prominent impact on the historical development of the revolutionary path of the Algerian liberation movement ..(Mouhamed Alarbi, 1984, p. 81)

It is also worth mentioning the internal situation of the "Algerian National Movement", as the crisis of the Algerian People's Party has worsened, and led to a separation between the Messalis and the centralists at the April 1953 Conference, and the tendency for armed action that was represented by the minority widens due to the failure of political action and the failure to save the party without achieving its goals. The event that restored their hope of continuation was the dispatch of "Abdelkrim Al-Khattabi" in 1952 two officers from the Moroccan countryside, namely Al-Hashimi Al-Tod and Mohamed Hammadi Al-Aziz, to search for Algerian militants ready for armed action. They first contacted members of the Movement for the Victory of Democratic Freedoms, Hussein Lahoul and Ahmed Mezghena, and agreed in principle on a later date to provide clarifications on the military project ..(Chikh, 2002, p. 82)

In the same context, Mr. Mohamed Boudiaf refers in his memoirs to a call by the activist and member of the Central Committee of the Movement for the Victory of Democratic Freedoms, "Abdelhamid Mehri", who told him about the two Moroccan officers and their project in Algeria, and set an appointment for him with them, so Mohamed Boudiaf contacted some militants from the secret organization in order to form a committee to consult on the subject proposed to him by the two Moroccan officers, which is to carry out military action at the Maghreb level. Indeed, Mohamed Boudiaf contacted Didouche Mourad and Mustapha Ben Boulaid and were able to form a quartet called the "Baraka" committee after the start of the revolution soon. The committee began preparing the list to contact the old members of the private organization, and began hold-

ing secret meetings to study the internal and external situation of Algeria ..(Boudiaf, 2001, p. 33)

Many historians interested in studying the revolutionary wing of the Algerian national movement agree that the crisis that blew up the most revolutionary current was not due to ideological conflicts within the party's leadership, but rather a crisis of people belonging to one revolutionary political movement, who disagreed on the issue of political commitment to initiate direct armed action ..(Harbi, 1982, p. 15)

The crisis of the Algerian national movement, is a crisis between two trends within one movement, the first trend announced its support for the presidency of Messali Hajj for life, while granting him all the powers to determine the political line, and the second trend brings together supporters of the Central Committee of the party, and the conflict between them was not because of power, but because of the divergence of practical orientations of the armed struggle and self-determination of the Algerian nation .(Mouhamed Alarbi, 1984, p. 82) The Algerian national movement has been condemned to stagnation and is no longer able to achieve the demand for independence for the Algerian people in the face of the arbitrariness of the French authorities, as the unity of parties for independence has become impossible because this goal did not concern the Algerian political parties ..(Elassli, 1984, p. 17).

Nine Algerian revolutionary youth were established in early 1954 by the "Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action" (CRAA): (Hocine Ait Ahmed, Ahmed Ben Bella, Mohamed Larbi Ben Mhidi, Mohamed Boudiaf, Mustapha Ben Boulaid , Rabah Bitat, Didouche Mourad, Mohamed Khider and Karim Belkacem), these belonged to the Movement for the Victory of Democratic Freedoms and most of them were middle class or poor in society, as they had previously served actively in the private organization and most of them spent periods in prisons, and the principle of " The Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action" is the necessity of unity for success .(Elassli, 1984, p. 17)

But things went aimlessly, the committee failed in its mission, and in front of this critical situation, prompted its members to hold a meeting 22 historic civil Algiers on June 25, 1954, which concluded with the report of the outbreak of the revolution, where Mohamed Boudiaf was elected as a national official, and the Committee of Five was formed working to prepare for the revolution, where the task of the revolutionary committee

will end, in addition to the members of the external delegation (Ben Bella, Mohamed Khider, Hussein Ait Ahmed) as the senior leadership of the revolution, after the failure of the efforts that wanted Messali Hajj or Mohamed Lamine Dabbaghin to be at the head of the leadership of the revolution .(Elassli, 1984, p. 18)

The National Liberation Front appeared openly in the first of November 1954, but it arose in fact on October 23, 1954, that is, at the end of the meeting of the six, where the Front was formed through three stages, the Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Labor initially included the founders of the Front and the centralists along with supporters of direct action Mustafa Ben Boulaid and Mohamed Boudiaf) and then joined by the historical group of twenty-two, and then the foreign mission of the Movement for the Victory of Democratic Freedoms in Cairo (Ait Ahmed Ahmad ibn Balla and Muhammad Khider .(Boudrham fatma, 1994, p. 8)

Away from all the complexities and conflicts, the "Nine Committee" adopted the principle of collective leadership and decided to blow up the revolution on the night of Al-Fateh in November 1954 .(kheda, 2012, p. 315) The birth certificate of the FLN was the statement of the first of November, an appeal addressed to all members of the Algerian people, which found an easy outlet to the hearts of all revolutionary fighters with a belief in the need to blow up the revolution.

#### 4. Conclusion: At the end of the research, the following can be concluded:

- The Algerian People's Party alone and not other Algerian political parties should be credited with adopting the idea of armed struggle as the only solution to liberate the country and take responsibility for its formulation and organization. The events of May 1954 affected the Algerian revolutionary path, as they created a crisis within the leadership of the People's Party with the need to actually start preparing for armed action and the explosion of the revolution. - The "Special Organization", although dissolved by the Movement for the Victory of Democratic Freedoms, served as the ground and platform from which the liberation revolution would be launched. - The establishment of the revolutionary current "Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action" and taking a position of neutrality enabled them to overcome the mistakes and crises of the Algerian national movement and start serious work to prepare for the outbreak of the armed revolution on November 1, 1954.

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