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| RESEARCH ARTICLE | |  | Juba I and the Quest for National Sovereignty During the Roman Factional Conflict |
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| Abstract | | | |
| <p>This study explores the historical and military significance of King Juba I of Numidia (85–46 BCE) during the Roman civil war between Julius Caesar and Pompey. Moving beyond traditional Roman-centric narratives, the paper repositions Juba I not as a mere regional ally of the Pompeians but as a sovereign African ruler pursuing national independence. Drawing on classical and modern sources, the research examines Juba I's military strategies, political ambitions, and alliance choices in the context of Rome's expanding colonial interests in North Africa. His calculated resistance—particularly through his role in the Curio campaign and the Battle of Thapsus—demonstrates a nationalist effort to preserve Numidian autonomy and reunite the kingdom envisioned by his grandfather, Masinissa. The paper concludes that Juba I's involvement in the Roman civil war was not submission to Roman factions but a strategic attempt to reclaim Numidian sovereignty in the face of imperial encroachment.</p> | | | |
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Introduction:

The Roman military power managed to dominate the Mediterranean after defeating Carthage in a war fought in three phases. Ultimately, the war became a source of wealth for Rome, benefiting its military leadership and aristocracy.

After turning Carthage into a Roman province known as *Provincia Africa*, Rome began directing its ambitions toward control and expansion.

Rome then entered into a war with the Numidian king Jugurtha at the end of the 2nd century and the beginning of the 1st century BCE. The conflict lasted seven years, as Jugurtha aspired to build a unified and independent Numidia free from foreign intervention. Jugurtha was fully aware of the prevailing stakes at the time and understood that Rome's expansionist policy would not stop at Carthage. In contrast, the descendants of King Massinissa—who had always been an ally of the Romans—stood against Rome in search of national sovereignty.

In the mid-1st century BCE, half a century after Jugurtha's resistance, another Numidian rebel emerged: Juba I, the Numidian king who ruled over the region extending from the Ampsaga River in the west to the Gulf of Greater Sirte in the east. He aspired not only to reclaim the province occupied by the Romans after the fall of Carthage in 146 BCE, but also to create a unified and strong Africa under the banner of his grandfather Massinissa's slogan: **"Africa for the Africans."** To achieve this, Juba I had to navigate the Roman civil war and its effects in Africa—specifically, the Numidian–Pompeian alliance confronting the opposing Mauritanian–Caesarian alliance.

This leads us to the central question of this paper: Who was Juba I as a historical and military figure? Was his alliance with the Pompeians and his military struggle against the Caesarians an act of submission to Roman interests, or a pursuit of national sovereignty?

1. The Personality of Juba I (85–46 BCE):

Juba I was the grandson of the Numidian king Massinissa and the son of King Hiempsal II. He is considered one of the great kings of Numidia. He was born in the city of Hippo (modern-day Annaba) in 85 BCEⁱ and was raised in the royal palace. Juba I was deeply concerned with asserting his presence and authority. He dressed in elegant and luxurious clothing, paid great attention to his hairstyle and beard, and preserved the customs and traditions of his country.

Unlike his father Hiempsal, who was more focused on intellectual pursuits, Juba I prioritized political and military affairs. He rejected Greco-Roman traditions and sought to distinguish himself as an authentic African leaderⁱⁱ.

Around 50 BCE, King Hiempsal II passed away, and his son Juba I succeeded him, ascending the Numidian throne around 60 BCE, while still a young man. His dream was to unify a strong Numidian kingdom, like that of his grandfather Masinissa. As a prince, he participated several times in political and diplomatic life, and during one of these missions, he drew the attention of the Roman orator Cicero while on a diplomatic mission in Rome between 64 and 63 BCEⁱⁱⁱ. This mission included demanding the extradition of the dissident Masintha, as well as defending the Numidian royal family's right to the properties inherited from their ancestors within what was then the Roman province of Africa.

This plea was made before the Senate, which was known as a competitive arena for Roman orators, where eloquence played a crucial role in influencing the audience and winning cases. Juba presented his case so strongly that it caused Julius Caesar to lose his temper—he stood up angrily and grabbed Juba's beard. From that moment on, there was a personal enmity between them, which likely explains why Juba I later allied himself with the Pompeians against Caesar^{iv}.

When Juba ascended the Numidian throne, he had already gained experience and training in governance^v and aspired to be a true king, modeled after the Hellenistic monarchs. He appointed a royal guard composed of Spanish and Gallic mercenaries for his personal security, especially under certain circumstances. In 49 BCE, the number of Gallic and Spanish cavalymen who served as Juba's bodyguards reached approximately two thousand, in addition to a very large number of native troops from among his people, both cavalry and armed infantry^{vi}.

Caesar mentions in his *African War* that "Juba I, who had been informed by Saburra about the night battle, put at his disposal two thousand Spanish and Gallic cavalymen, whom he usually kept close for his personal safety, while the infantry was entrusted to those he trusted the most."^{viii}

2. Juba I: The Politician and Military Leader

Not many historical sources have survived about Juba I. The first references to him appear in connection with his conflict with Caesar. From these sources, it is clear that Juba I had a military upbringing, marked by courage and boldness, which made him passionate about military affairs and enamored with power. One of his first actions upon assuming power was to organize the military force—not only relying on Numidian troops but also recruiting elements from other Mediterranean peoples, seeking to benefit from their experience in pursuit of his political and military ambitions^{ix}.

Juba I and His Military and Political Role

Juba I personally commanded his well-organized armies, following a tradition established by the Massyli kings from Naravas and Gaia to Masinissa and Jugurtha. This military background indicates that Juba I aimed to transform the Numidian kingdom into an emerging military power with a professional standing army. Such a force would allow the rise of competent military leaders and elevate the army from an irregular militia—relying on emergency conscription without training or discipline—to a structured and efficient military institution.

The initiation of such a military project reflects Juba I's ambitions, which went beyond the traditional internal security role of the army. His vision extended toward broader regional influence—an ambition that likely raised serious concerns in both Rome and neighboring Mauretania to the west.

Historical sources reference the significant size of the Numidian army under Juba I. According to the Latin historian Appian, the army comprised approximately 30,000 infantry, 20,000 cavalry, and a notable number of archers^x. Although these figures may be exaggerated, they suggest that Numidia had considerable military capabilities—possibly exceeding those of the Romans in the African province^x.

Juba's military focus not only enabled him to secure internal victories—such as launching major campaigns against rebellious tribes and invading the territory of Leptis allied with Rome—but he also devoted attention to urban development. He adorned his capital, Zama Regia, with luxurious buildings, palaces, temples, and fortified walls for defense in times of war. This reflects Juba's comprehensive governance strategy^{xi}.

During his reign, Juba I never received the title of "Friend of Rome"^{xii}. On the contrary, his actions increasingly alarmed the Roman Senate and key figures such as Cicero, who came to view him as a second Jugurtha. Eventually, Juba played a significant role in the Roman civil conflict, which spread to Africa. Due to his alliance with Pompey's faction, Rome officially declared Juba I an "enemy of the Roman people"^{xiii}.

3 - The Conflict Between Pompey and Caesar and the Role of the Numidian King Juba I:

1.3 - The Situation in Numidia Prior to Caesar's Campaign:

Following the conspiracy that led to the capture of Jugurtha, Numidia^{xiv} was not annexed to Roman territories, due to the wars Rome was engaged in in Gaul. Thus, Numidia remained separate from Roman possessions. However, historical sources^{xv} indicate that Numidia was divided into three parts: one-third, the western part, was granted to Mauretania and its king Bocchus I as a reward for his participation in the plot to capture Jugurtha. In return, he received the title "Friend and Ally of the Roman People"^{xvi}. Some historians suggest that Mauretania's borders extended as far as Saldæ (modern-day Béjaïa)^{xvii}.

The third bordering Roman Africa was assigned to Prince Gauda. As for the central third of Numidia, Cicero^{xviii} indicates that it was given to an unknown figure. He refers to this region as the Kingdom of the Mastanisosus, which was likely a buffer zone between the kingdoms of Gauda and Bocchus I^{xix}.

Following these events, historical records fall silent regarding the developments in Numidia during the reign of King Gauda, making this period one of the most obscure in North African history^{xx}—until the arrival of Julius Caesar's campaign, when King Hiempsal and Massinissa II were ruling^{xxi}.

The history of Numidia tends to be marginalized, only mentioned when it intersects with Roman events. Therefore, accounts of the Numidians reached us primarily through their involvement in the conflict between Sulla and Marius, during which the Maghreb became a theater of war. Numidia aligned with the Roman aristocratic Republican faction.

According to the events, a Numidian prince named **Hirbas** took advantage of the political conflict between Caesar and Sulla to launch what could be seen as a rebellion against Roman authority. He managed to seize power from Kings Hiempsal II and Massinissa II and unify Numidia under his rule, having secured the support of Marius' faction in North Africa. Thus, Hirbas' usurpation of the Numidian throne marked a victory for the Populares (Marius' supporters) in the African province^{xxii}, and he became a strong ally for them in the region. Meanwhile, Hiempsal II^{xxiii}—father of Juba I—was a supporter of Pompey and Sulla^{xxiv}.

3.2. The Situation in Rome Before Caesar's Campaign:

Rome experienced intense factional conflict during the era of the Roman Republic between two political parties: the aristocratic party (the Senate) and the populares (the commoners). The latter traced its roots to the reformist movement of the Gracchus brothers — Tiberius (162 BCE–133 BCE) and Gaius (154 BCE–121 BCE) — who, after being successively elected as tribunes of the plebs (Tribunus Plebis)^{xxv}, were both assassinated due to their efforts to fulfill the aspirations of the lower classes. They had attempted to pass agrarian laws redistributing land in newly conquered territories to the poor. However, these efforts were fiercely resisted by the aristocrats, leading to violent confrontations and a prolonged struggle between the populares, led first by Marius and later by Caesar, and the aristocrats, led by Sulla and then Pompey^{xxvi}.

This conflict led to several civil wars, one of the most significant being Caesar's campaign. The populares represented the ambitions of the common people, while the aristocrats fought to defend the interests of the patrician class. These political shifts in Rome had a notable impact on North Africa, which often bore the brunt of the conflicts arising from this internal Roman struggle.

After the death of Marius, Sulla was declared dictator in 82 BCE. He sent Pompey to North Africa to eliminate Marius's supporters. Historical sources unanimously confirm that Pompey defeated the Marian forces in North Africa^{xxvii}, deposed Hirbas from the Numidian throne^{xxviii}, and restored Hiempsal II. Hiempsal was later succeeded by his son Juba I, who would play a significant role in the Roman political conflict between Pompey and Caesar.

This raises the question: Was Juba I's alliance with Pompey a sign of subservience to Rome, a personal act of vengeance, or a genuine attempt to assert national sovereignty?

4- The Curio Campaign (49 BCE):

After the end of the First Civil War in Rome, two major military leaders emerged: Pompey and Julius Caesar, both from the most prestigious Roman families. Politically, Pompey leaned toward the Senate (Senatus), while Caesar fully aligned himself with the *Populares* (People's Party), the heirs of Marius^{xxix}.

Thanks to Caesar's military expansions, he added a vast territory to the Roman Empire that included all of modern-day France and Belgium. When the Senate grew fearful of Caesar's return to Rome and his bid for the consulship, it began seeking a strong figure to oppose him^{xxx}. They found this figure in Pompey, who was enticed by the promise of military leadership and thus allied himself with the Senate and began promoting its principles. This marked the

beginning of the conflict between Caesar and Pompey—similar to the one that had erupted half a century earlier between Marius and Sulla.

Caesar tried to reach a reconciliation with the Senate through mediators, but the Senate's response was to order the disbanding of his armies. Without hesitation, Caesar retaliated in less than half an hour by ordering a detachment of his troops to march from the Po Valley toward Rome in 49 BCE. Caught unprepared for such a swift response, the Senate was forced to negotiate with Pompey. Pompey replied that the forces under his command were insufficient to stop Caesar's advance. As Caesar neared Rome, Pompey, along with most of the senators and many nobles and dignitaries, fled the city^{xxxi}.

After Caesar took control of Italy, he turned his attention to Spain, which he conquered. On his return to Rome, the city of Massilia (Marseille) surrendered to him. He then declared himself dictator. Before pursuing Pompey in Brundisium—and to prevent his enemies from starving Rome—he launched military campaigns into several provinces, including the province of Africa. By the time Caesar reached Brundisium in October 49 BCE, Pompey had established his military base in Macedonia^{xxxii}.

Pompey had also stationed his forces in Africa, a province he had been assigned since the First Triumvirate agreement in 60 BCE. Africa became the stronghold of the Pompeian faction, supported by Varus, Cato, Scipio, and the Numidian King Juba I^{xxxiii}.

During the conflict between Caesar and Pompey, **Juba I** sided with **Pompey**. On **January 11, 49 BC**, Caesar's conflict with his opponents took on a new dimension as they left Italy to reorganize their forces in the **Balkans, Spain, and Africa**, which Caesar considered provinces supplying Rome^{xxxiv} with foodstuffs. While Caesar himself led the campaign in Spain, he assigned his commander **Curio**^{xxxv} to head to Africa to fight the governor of Utica, **Attius Varus**, a Pompeian ally who had previously defeated **Catulus** and allied with **Juba I**.

Curio landed at **Acholla**, located between two elevated headlands in the northeastern Gulf of the peninsula, and then proceeded to **Cape Bon** (northeastern Tunisia), where he laid siege to **Utica**^{xxxvi}. At that point, Juba I personally moved to support Varus, the governor of Utica, and to take revenge on Curio, who had previously advocated in a Senate session for **the annexation of Numidia into Roman territory**—one of the reasons for Juba's enmity toward Caesar. Therefore, Curio was seen as an enemy of the **Numidian people** as well^{xxxvii}.

All of Pompey's supporters joined Varus in Utica, which greatly contributed to the city's fortification. In addition, **Juba I** advanced with a large **Numidian army** that Curio could not withstand. Although the population of Utica supported Caesar, they **did not aid Curio**, which left him unable to secure victory and forced him to withdraw and request reinforcements from **Sicily**^{xxxviii}.

King Juba of Numidia then **devised a military plan to eliminate Curio**, assigning his commander **Sabura** to lead a **small detachment** and camp about **ten miles south of Utica**^{xxxix}, while Juba himself encamped **six miles further away**. Juba then employed a clever propaganda tactic by having **local Roman agents and Numidian informants** spread the rumor that the king had **returned to Numidia** due to unrest in the province. Once the news spread, **Curio believed** that Juba had indeed withdrawn, leaving behind only a small force under Sabura's command. This ruse proved to be a **masterstroke**, demonstrating Juba's deep understanding of **strategic deception** to destabilize his enemy^{xl}.

During the conflict between Caesar and Pompey, King Juba I sided with Pompey^{xli}. On January 11, 49 BC, Caesar's struggle with his opponents took on new dimensions as they left Italy to regroup in the Balkans, Spain, and Africa — which Caesar considered as provinces supplying Rome with provisions. Caesar personally led the campaign in Spain, while he assigned his commander, Curio, to go to Africa to fight the governor of Utica, Attius Varus, a supporter of Pompey who had allied with Juba I after defeating Catulus^{xlii}.

Curio landed at *Aculleria*, between two high points in a bay in the northeast of the peninsula, then at Cape Bon (northeast Tunisia), and besieged Utica. At that time, Juba I personally intervened to aid Varus, the governor of Utica,

and to avenge himself on Curio, who had once demanded in a Senate session the annexation of Numidia to Roman territory. This was one of the reasons for Juba's hostility towards Caesar, and thus Curio was also considered an enemy of the Numidian people^{xiii}.

All of Pompey's supporters joined Varus in Utica, strengthening its fortifications. In addition, Juba I advanced with a large Numidian force that Curio could not match. Although the inhabitants of the city were Caesar's supporters, they did not assist Curio, which left him unable to win and forced him to withdraw and request reinforcements from Sicily.

The Numidian king devised a military strategy to eliminate Curio, assigning his general *Sabura* to lead a small force and encamp ten miles south of Utica, while Juba himself camped six miles from there. He employed psychological warfare through local agents and Numidian scouts, spreading the rumor that he had returned to Numidia due to unrest. When this news reached Curio, he believed the king had indeed returned to his kingdom, leaving behind only a small force under Sabura's command. This was a clever and strategic maneuver, as Juba understood the value of deception in disorienting the enemy.

Sabura lured Curio toward the *Majrada* coast. The Caesarians launched their attack, and part of King Juba's plan was for Sabura to feign a retreat to draw them in. The Caesarians were soon exhausted by the intense heat and the lack of water sources for themselves and their horses. They scattered, allowing the infantry units to catch up. Before long, Sabura reappeared, backed by reinforcements from the king's elite cavalry composed of Spaniards and Gauls.

When news of King Juba I's victory over Caesar's supporters reached the Pompeians, they began to see the Numidian army as a powerful force capable of defeating Caesar's faction. In their first meeting with Juba, he reminded them of the alliance condition and the promise the Roman Senate had made to him: to hand over the Roman African province to him. He argued that this province was African land and should return to the African people. The Republican Senate, during its session in Greece, declared Juba a friend of the Roman people and agreed to grant him the province after defeating Caesar's faction.

From this, it appears that King Juba I's conspiracy and support for the Pompeians was not driven by a desire for dependency, but by a quest for sovereignty and the reclamation of the African province, which he considered rightfully theirs. He conditioned his alliance on the Senate's promise to hand him the African province, asserting that it belonged to the African people. This reveals the patriotic spirit of a king who sought to reunify the Kingdom of Numidia.

However, bartering victory over the Caesarians for the African province was no simple matter — even if the Republicans triumphed. Victorious armies do not easily relinquish territory, nor do they uphold such promises. It is likely that the Republicans made this pledge merely to secure Juba's support, as both factions sought to gain allies in Numidia^{xiv}.

5- Caesar's Campaign in Africa and the Role of the Numidians in Resisting It:

When Caesar landed in Africa, he attempted to seize Hadrumetum, but failed and retreated to Ruspina. However, he managed to defend against enemy attacks. Caesar was later besieged after the arrival of Metellus Scipio with eight cohorts and three thousand cavalry, in addition to the Numidian army led by King Juba I. The two armies now stood face to face, and Caesar did not dare to give the signal to attack due to his limited forces — until the Pompeian cavalry advanced and occupied nearby hills to prevent the Caesarians from retreating there. These hills are believed to be near what is today called Lake Sahline.

Caesar believed he could only succeed in this battle through cunning and strategic skill, not by direct confrontation. In reality, the Pompeian movement toward those hills was a prelude to encircle Caesar's forces. This was followed by an attack from Pompeian and Numidian infantry, and arrows rained down on Caesar's troops. However, his soldiers managed to repel the attack and prevented them from advancing. They did not pursue the enemy, in accordance with Caesar's orders, to avoid ambushes. Caesar's forces succeeded in this confrontation^{xv}.

The battle did not decisively favor either side, as both suffered significant casualties. Nonetheless, the Pompeians considered themselves victorious in that engagement, according to some historical accounts^{shl}.

Caesar spent four months on African soil without being able to decisively end the conflict with his enemies. However, he did benefit from multiple skirmishes with the Pompeians and Numidians, and from the war of attrition waged against him. These engagements taught him how to deal with the light and agile Numidian cavalry, who inflicted losses on his forces through swift attacks, particularly on the horses used for pulling or fighting with spears. Caesar's cavalry could not defeat them without infantry support.

Although Caesar's losses were relatively small compared to the time he spent in Africa, anxiety likely began to grow among his troops — as well as within the Pompeian forces — regarding the outcome of the conflict. This ultimately led to the decisive battle between Caesar and the Pompeians^{shii}, known as the Disaster of Thapsus in 46 BCE.

6- The Disaster of Thapsus (46 BC) and the End of the Numidian Entity:

The battle took place in the region of Thapsus*, in a location shaped like an isthmus between the eastern edge of Sebkha Moknine and the seashore. It was the site chosen by Caesar, who succeeded in luring his opponents there. The plan of Scipio, which was to lure Caesar's forces to the same place and then seal the isthmus from the north and south to impose a complete siege, failed. It seems that Caesar uncovered his opponents' intentions and took precautions, determined to trap them with the very scheme they had devised for him^{shiii}.

Caesar launched two sweeping attacks: the first defeated and scattered Scipio's army; the second targeted the northern isthmus, which had been taken by King Juba I as his personal camp. Caesar crushed his enemies in this attack, with their death toll exceeding ten thousand^{shix}.

With Caesar's victory at Thapsus, the remaining Pompeian forces scattered. As for the Numidian king Juba I, he managed to escape and reach his capital, Zama, traveling by night and hiding by day. But tragedy struck when the city refused to open its gates to the defeated king. Meanwhile, the people of Zama welcomed the victorious emperor (Caesar) with great celebration. Juba I, who had lost his kingdom and was denied entry to his capital and access to his family, chose death over captivity by Caesar—he committed suicide by poison^l.

The disaster was due to poor management and weak leadership on the Republican side. Although sources claim the combined forces of the royal army and Scipio's army amounted to around 80,000 men, with some sources citing up to 50,000 killed (an exaggerated figure), the *African War* source provides a more reasonable number—about 10,000 deaths.

Regardless of the exact figures, the Republicans had considerable military resources in Africa. Thus, the root of the failure lay in leadership and strategic planning. Command had been entrusted to someone lacking military distinction—Scipio (Metellus Scipio)—instead of the cavalry commander Labienus, who had been sidelined from supreme command. They also ignored the advice of King Juba, who had stressed the necessity of eliminating Caesar's cavalymen, especially in Utica. It later became clear that those cavalymen played a vital role for Caesar by gathering intelligence, spreading confusion, and stirring up tribal tensions, particularly among the Gaetulians. This unrest was fueled by the presence of entrenched Roman communities in Africa. How could these locals support a party allied with the Numidian king, who intended to make Africa his realm, turning them from citizens of Zama into subjects of a king known for his deep hostility toward everything Roman and Caesarian?^h

In contrast to Caesar's military and political acumen, which included a strategy of luring his opponents toward the isthmus, establishing fortifications in elevated areas, and securing key elements in preparation for a decisive moment—along with relying on his fleet as a last resort in case of defeat—

7. The Impact of the Second Civil War between Pompey and Caesar on Numidia:

After the Battle of Thapsus in 46 BCE, Caesar began reorganizing Africa following the suicide of the Numidian King Juba I. The consequences of this war were devastating for Numidia.

The eastern part of Numidia was transformed into a new Roman province known as Africa Nova, to distinguish it from the older province of Africa Vetus. The remaining parts of Numidia were divided between Bocchus and Sittius as a reward for their support of Caesar. Bocchus received the area extending from the Soummam Valley (Wadi al-Sahel) to the Wadi M'saga (the Great Wadi)ⁱⁱⁱ. To the west, the boundaries of the new Roman province extended from a line passing through Hippo Regius (Annaba) and Rusicade (Skikda), sloping southwest toward Calama (Guelma), then southeast to reach Capsa (Gafsa)ⁱⁱⁱ. Caesar made this boundary a dividing line between the Kingdom of Bocchus and the newly established Africa Nova^{iv}.

The Kingdom of Numidia ceased to exist, and a new political map was drawn in North Africa. This included the creation of a new Roman province and the eastward expansion of Mauretania. Additionally, some lands were granted to the mercenary Sittius.

Caesar auctioned off the properties of King Juba I and took punitive measures against individuals and cities that had sided with his enemies. These included the confiscation of assets and the imposition of financial penalties^v.

There is no doubt that the Roman government—whether aristocratic-republican or populist-democratic—pursued a clear, gradual policy of colonization and territorial expansion. This was especially true regarding neighboring regions rich in fertile land capable of supplying the Roman economy with wheat, olives, and other products. Moreover, Italian merchants had already taken over many areas of those kingdoms and provinces, integrating their economies with that of Rome as a prelude to full annexation.

Historian Theodor Mommsen remarked that during the Republic, Rome was content to preserve the corpse (i.e., control over territory) without breathing new life into it. Its motives were not love for conquest but fear of rivals. This explains why Rome created the province of Africa following the fall of Carthage—not due to hatred for the Carthaginians, but fear of strong Numidia under King Masinissa and later Micipsa^{vi}.

Thus, following the devastating aftermath of the Battle of Thapsus—which ended the Numidian state—there were major political changes in the Numidian map. The first such change occurred after the Jugurthine War, which did not significantly affect Numidia because Rome was then preoccupied with internal conflicts and wars in Gaul. During that time, Bocchus I, King of Mauretania, acquired most of western Numidia—extending his territory as far as modern-day Béjaïa—in return for helping Rome defeat Jugurtha. Additionally, Leptis was detached from Numidia during the civil war between Marius and Sulla, known as the First Roman Civil War.

The second major transformation occurred during the conflict between Pompey and Caesar, in which King Juba I of Numidia played a direct role. As a result of the Battle of Thapsus in 46 BCE, the Kingdom of Numidia was dismantled. Caesar divided it among his allies—Sittius and Bocchus. Bocchus received the region between the Soummam Valley and Wadi M'saga (El-Kebir), while Sittius was given a district near Cirta, which Caesar designated as a boundary between the new Roman province and the Kingdom of Mauretania^{vii}.

Conclusion

After addressing our topic under the title "Juba I and the Quest for National Sovereignty", we have arrived at several important conclusions, the most notable of which is:

The war waged by Juba I against the Romans had a decisive and destructive impact on Africa, ultimately resulting in the annexation of the Numidian Kingdom into Roman territories, completing Rome's domination over the Mediterranean Sea.

However, the focus should not solely be on the war's outcome, but rather on understanding Juba I's heroism, his astute military character, and the true motive behind his war: was it loyalty to Rome as his father had shown, or a

genuine pursuit of national sovereignty? Juba's lifelong dream was to unify a strong Numidian Kingdom, just like his grandfather Masinissa, under the slogan "Africa for Africans."

Juba I consistently reminded the Romans of Jugurtha, and this was not lost on the imperialists. He entered into a dangerous conflict against Caesar—fully aware that Caesar was not merely aiming to defeat the Pompeians, but that, if victorious, he would also eliminate the Numidian Kingdom, which had previously destroyed Curio's campaign. Caesar's real objective was the complete annihilation of Numidia. Juba knew this well, especially after witnessing Curio's request to the Roman Senate to annex Numidia to Roman possessions, thus exposing the Roman aristocratic party's colonial ambitions early on.

Juba understood that defeating this aristocratic party—whose primary goal was colonization, expansion, and acquisition of fertile lands—was essential.

Juba's involvement in the Caesarian-Pompeian civil war was justified by his belief in the possibility of liberating the land from Roman control, especially since the war was taking place on African soil. Thus, Juba I's nationalist and independence-driven motive was clear.

In the end, Juba, who crushed Curio's expedition, combined military excellence with deep insight into Numidia's internal affairs, and sought to unify it. Yet, like Jugurtha before him, he was thwarted by Rome's strategy of sowing discord among Africans—beginning with its manipulation of Masinissa and Syphax, turning them against each other in warfare that ultimately destroyed one of them. This interference in internal affairs was the root cause of the disintegration.

The alliance of Bocchus I with the Romans to defeat Jugurtha was repeated by Bocchus II, who also sided with Rome to attack Numidia from behind, placing the kingdom between two fires and destabilizing it. Rome used these tactics—spreading division, and leveraging a mix of incentives and intimidation among African kings—to control the region. Otherwise, why would both Bocchus I and II ally with Rome against the Numidian kings, only to be eliminated in turn?

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ⁱⁱ Stéphane Gsell, Ancient History of North Africa, Hachette Bookstore, Boulevard Saint-Germain, Vol. VII, Paris, 1928, p. 292.

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^{iv} Mohamed El-Saghir Ghanem, Mohamed El-Arbi Aqqoun, Mohamed Salah Bouanaka, Resistance and Ancient Military History, Publications of the National Center for Studies and Research in the National Movement and the November 1st, 1954 Revolution, Algeria, 2007, p. 321.

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^{vi} Stéphane Gsell, Vol. VIII, p. 43.

^{vii} Caesar, The Civil War, Book II, translated by M. Nisard, France, 1865, p. XL.

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^x Appian, History of the Civil Wars of the Roman Republic, translated by Dalexandrie, Vol. 2, Paris, 1808, Book II, p. 96.

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^{xvii} Mohamed El-Saghir Ghanem, Op. cit., The Kingdom of Numidia and the Punic Civilization, Dar Al-Unmah for Printing and Distribution, Algeria, 1998, pp. 224 and 93.

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^{xix} Cicero, Correspondence, translated by Jean Bayet, Vol. V, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1964.

^{xx} Mohamed El-Saghir Ghanem, The Kingdom of Numidia and the Punic Civilization, p. 93.

^{xxi} Mohamed El-Hadi Harche, The Kingdom of Numidia: A Civilizational Study, 2013, p. 27.

^{xxii} Mohamed El-Saghir Ghanem, The Kingdom of Numidia and the Punic Civilization, p. 93.

^{xxiii} Hierbas: A Numidian king who seized power from Hiempsal II, the son of Gauda and nephew of Jugurtha. Hiempsal had sided with Sulla's supporters in the conflict against Marius, who fled to Africa after his rival seized control of Rome in 88 BC. Hierbas took advantage of the situation by supporting Marius, which allowed him to usurp power from Hiempsal II. See: Mohamed El-Hadi Harche, The Political and Economic Evolution in Numidia from the Accession of Massinissa to the Death of Juba I (203-46 BC), Houma Publishing and Distribution, Algeria, p. 72.

^{xxiv} Mohamed El-Saghir Ghanem, The Kingdom of Numidia and the Punic Civilization, p. 94.

^{xxv} Mohamed El-Arabi Akoun, Op. cit., p. 7.

^{xxvi} Mohamed El-Hadi Harche, *The Kingdom of Numidia: A Civilizational Study*, 2013, p. 31.

^{xxvii} Mohamed El-Arabi Akoun, *From the Military History of Ancient North Africa – Julius Caesar’s Campaign in Africa and the Struggle of Juba I (47–46 B.C.): A Study in Political and Military History*, Hussein Ras Al-Jibal Publishing and Distribution, 1st Edition, Algeria, 2018, p. XIII. See also: Howard Hayes Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero: A History of Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D.*, New York, 2010.

^{xxviii} Mohamed El-Saghir Ghanem, *The Kingdom of Numidia and the Punic Civilization*, p. 93.

^{xxix} *Ibid.*, p. 94.

^{xxx} Mohamed El-Arabi Akoun, *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

^{xxxi} Abdel Latif Ahmed Ali, *Roman History – The Age of Revolution (From Tiberius Gracchus to Octavius Augustus)*, Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabia, Egypt, 1988, p. 147.

^{xxxii} Ibrahim Rizqallah Ayoub, *Roman History*, International Writing Company, 1st Edition, Lebanon, p. 228.

^{xxxiii} *Ibid.*, pp. 229–230.

^{xxxiv} Zaghbib Hassina, *The First Civil War in Rome and Its Impact on the Maghreb (88–31 B.C.)*, Master’s Thesis in Ancient History, Algeria, 2012, p. 82.

^{xxxv} The First Triumvirate: a secret agreement that facilitated Caesar’s path to power, formed by the wealthy Crassus, the militarily powerful Pompey, and the cunning Caesar. They established the Triumvirate and dominated the people and the Senate. See: Zaghbib Hassina, *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

Cato: Appointed governor of Sicily, he supported Pompey against Caesar and was tasked with defending the city of Utica from Caesar. He committed suicide after Pompey’s followers were defeated by Caesar. He was called Cato Uticensis to distinguish him from his grandfather Cato the Elder, the censor. See: Abdel Latif Ahmed Ali, *Op. cit.*, p. 278.

^{xxxvi} *Ibid.*, p. 84.

^{xxxvii} Mohamed El-Arabi Aqoun, *Julius Caesar’s Campaign in Africa and the Struggle of Juba I*, p. 9.

^{xxxviii} Nashī Ibrahim, *History of the Romans from the Earliest Times until 133 B.C.*, Vol. 2, Anglo-Egyptian Library, Cairo, 1983, p. 62.

^{xxxix} Appian, *Civil Wars*, II, 44; Stéphane Gsell, *Op. cit.*, Vol. VII, p. 11.

^{xl} Dio Cassius, *Roman History*, translated by Earnest Gary, London, 1956, Book XLI, 41.3.

^{xli} Dio Cassius, *Book XLI*, 42.1.

^{xlii} He was one of the most prominent commanders mentioned in ancient texts, though the information about him in those sources is brief. He played a significant role in defeating Curio’s campaign and later in resisting the pirate invasion led by Sittius. See: Mohamed El-Arabi Aqoun, *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

^{xliii} Stéphane Gsell, *Vol. VIII*, pp. 19–20.

^{xliiii} Mohamed El-Arabi Aqoun, *Julius Caesar’s Campaign in Africa and the Struggle of Juba I*, p. 14.

^{xlv} Medjerda River: A river that originates in Algeria and ends entirely within Tunisian territory. It is considered the last river in the territory of the Second Numidian Kingdom and was historically known as the Bagrada River, whose course brings us back to ancient Africa itself. See:

Tissot, Charles Joseph, *Exploration scientifique de la Tunisie : géographie comparée de la province romaine d’Afrique*. Tome 1, publié par Salomon Reinach, Ministère de l’Instruction publique, Paris, 1884, pp.57, 58. ; Paskoff Roland, *Le Delta de la Medjerda (Tunisie) depuis l’antiquité*, Études Rurales, N°133-134, Littoraux en perspectives, 1994, pp.15-29.

^{xlv} Appian, *History of the Civil Wars*, II, 45.

^{xlv} Mohamed El-Arabi Aqoun, *Julius Caesar’s Campaign in Africa and the Struggle of Juba I*, p. 14.

^{xlv} Mohamed El-Saghir Ghanem, Mohamed El-Arabi Aqoun, Mohamed Salah Bouanaka, *Resistance and Ancient Maghreb Military History*, p. 331.

^{xlv} *Ibid.*, p. 331.

ⁱ Stéphane Gsell, *op. cit.*, pp. 64–65.

ⁱⁱ Appian, *History of the Civil Wars*, 95.

ⁱⁱⁱ Mohamed El-Arabi Aqoun, *Julius Caesar’s Campaign in Africa and the Struggle of Juba I*, p. 116.

This fortified city is located on the seashore, 12 miles (approximately 18 km) southeast of Leptis Minor, near Cape Demas, as confirmed by Gsell. Its ruins are still visible today, and it is considered one of the oldest and most important Phoenician outposts established in this region. See: Mohamed El-Arabi Aqoun, *op. cit.*, p. 133; Stéphane Gsell, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

ⁱⁱⁱ Ghanem Mohamed El-Saghir, *op. cit.*, p. 337.

^{iv} *Ibid.*, pp. 338–339.

^v Jamel Masrahi, *The Numidian Resistance to Roman Occupation in the Southeastern Algerian Region: The Aurès and Desert Frontiers Revolt as a Model*, Master’s Thesis, Algeria, 2009, p. 86.

^{vi} Ghanem Mohamed El-Saghir, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

^{vii} Zaghbib Hassina, *op. cit.*, p. 96.