

		Science, Education and Innovations in the Context of Modern Problems Issue 11, Vol. 8, 2025	
		Title of research article 	
		The Decline of Figurative Representations of Mental Pathology in Caravaggio: A Comparative Analysis in Light of Social Determinants, Biological Anthropology	
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Issue web link		https://imcra-az.org/archive/385-science-education-and-innovations-in-the-context-of-modern-problems-issue-11-vol-8-2025.html	
Keywords		Caravaggio, madness, figurative art, biological anthropology, social determinants, Counter-Reformation, semiotics, camera obscura.	
Abstract This paper investigates the apparent decline or absence of figurative representations of mental pathology in the works of Michelangelo Merisi da Caravaggio (1571–1610), a pivotal figure in Baroque art. While early modern European visual culture particularly in the works of Hieronymus Bosch and Pieter Bruegel displayed overt iconography of madness, Caravaggio's oeuvre appears to lack direct depictions of mental illness, despite his commitment to hyperrealism and psychological tension. The analysis employs an interdisciplinary framework combining visual semiotics, Foucauldian discourse analysis, biological anthropology, and art-historical method to explore the underlying causes of this shift. Central to the argument is the claim that social determinants especially ecclesiastical censorship during the Counter-Reformation and the emerging naturalistic aesthetic suppressed symbolic representations of deviance, including madness. Drawing on selected works such as David with the Head of Goliath, Judith Beheading Holofernes, and The Taking of Christ, the paper argues that while emotional extremity is powerfully portrayed, clinical or allegorical madness is conspicuously absent. This lacuna reflects not an oversight but a culturally embedded reconfiguration of how mental suffering was visualized. The paper also examines the role of technological changes, such as the use of camera obscura, in promoting a form of "optical truth" that displaced metaphorical renderings. Finally, the study situates these findings in a broader genealogy of medicalized and depoliticized portrayals of mental illness in Western art. By reassessing Caravaggio's silence on madness, this paper contributes to current debates in medical humanities and visual culture, underscoring the intersection between aesthetics, pathology, and power in the early modern period and beyond.			
Citation. Kerdouci H.B. (2025). The Decline of Figurative Representations of Mental Pathology in Caravaggio: A Comparative Analysis in Light of Social Determinants, Biological Anthropology. <i>Science, Education and Innovations in the Context of Modern Problems</i> , 8(11), 1240–1250. https://doi.org/10.56334/sci/8.11.102			
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Received: 01.02.2025		Accepted: 10.08.2025	
		Publishing time: 27.11.2025	

Introduction

The depiction of mental pathology in Western visual culture has long served as a mirror reflecting societal attitudes toward deviance, suffering, and subjectivity. From the grotesque and allegorical figures of madness in Hieronymus Bosch's *The Garden of Earthly Delights* to the personified melancholia in Albrecht Dürer's

engravings, early European art displayed a rich iconography of psychic disturbance. In this context, the near absence of explicit representations of mental illness in the works of Caravaggio is striking.

Caravaggio (1571–1610) emerged as a revolutionary artist during a period marked by political repression, religious dogmatism, and scientific inquiry. Known for his unflinching realism, dramatic chiaroscuro, and psychological depth, Caravaggio portrayed saints, criminals, and martyrs with visceral immediacy. Yet, unlike his predecessors and contemporaries, he rarely, if ever, offered figurative representations of madness or mental disorder. This raises a central question: **Why did Caravaggio, an artist deeply invested in human suffering and affect, refrain from depicting madness as a distinct visual category?**

This paper argues that Caravaggio's apparent omission of madness is not merely an aesthetic choice but a product of intersecting historical forces: (1) the social determinants shaped by the Counter-Reformation and the Inquisition; (2) the decline of symbolic, medieval, and pre-modern conceptions of madness as personified vice or demonic possession; and (3) the advent of new technologies such as the camera obscura that prioritized visual "truth" over allegorical complexity.

Employing an interdisciplinary methodology that integrates art history, biological anthropology, social theory, and technological history, this study will explore the decline of madness as a figurative theme in Caravaggio's art. It seeks to reveal how the suppression or transformation of mental pathology in visual form reveals not only shifts in artistic technique but deeper cultural and epistemological realignments.

1. The Foucauldian Discourse on Madness:

Michel Foucault's thought, particularly in his book (Foucault, 2006) *Madness and Civilization* (1961), provides a starting point for understanding how society's perception of madness changed between the Middle Ages and the modern era. According to Foucault, madness transitioned from being a cultural phenomenon circulating in art and society to institutionalized isolation within hospitals and monasteries. This transition began in the time of Caravaggio, leading to the disappearance of the mad from the public sphere and subsequently from visual narratives. The importance of Michel Foucault's book, *History of Madness in the Classical Age: Madness and Mental Disorder*, this foundational work, which was credited with establishing a new truth and which continues to occupy the entire scope of critical study (epistemology) of the human sciences since the word "madness" was first used. How can one study the question of the incarceration of the insane in the ancient and contemporary regimes without first referring to this thesis? How can one claim to understand what Foucault wrote when this author employs multiple methods that deliberately and intentionally overlap with one another? How can we distinguish when he is a philosopher, when he is a sociologist, and when he is a historian? Therefore, like Diderot's cuckoo who glorified systematic thought, we will focus in this reading only on historical discourse since there is indeed a historical discourse because it paves the way for addressing problems that can no longer be avoided. Foucault emphasizes that he does not want to review the history of psychiatry, but rather the history of madness itself "in its prime, before knowledge curbed it." But what are the dates, or, as he puts it, what are the two events on which he will base his research? 1657 (actually 1656): "the establishment of the general hospital and the great internment of the poor," "1794" (actually 1793): the release of the chained in Bicetre. These are two events that, of course, constitute (among other facts) crucial moments in the history of internment, and thus in the history of psychiatry. Between these two dates, there was a transition "from the medieval and human experience of madness to that experience based on our own experience, which frames madness within the limits of mental illness." During the Middle Ages and up to the Renaissance, the dialectic between man and madness was a dramatic one that placed man in conflict and confrontation with the deafening forces of the world; Thus, the experience of madness was fraught with images related to the Fall and perfection, the monster, the metamorphosis, and all the astonishing secrets of knowledge. In our time, however, the experience of madness is enveloped in silence and surrounded by the tranquility of knowledge that has been forgotten after having been absorbed in its research and learned so much about it." We conclude from this that "earlier" madness—that is, madness stemming from idiocy (mental disorder in the Middle Ages) was of a special nature and a radically different structure from "later" madness stemming from reason (rationalism in the classical era). This

introduction, which ends in this way, is only the prelude to a long historical demonstration that led, in the first part, to the writing of a widely celebrated treatise on the “great arrest” a term coined by Michel Foucault through the historical term “confinement” whereby the royal authority, in the name of reason, decided to politically imprison the mad. The first idea presented in the chapter entitled “The Ship of Fools” was: with the disappearance of leprosy at the end of the Middle Ages, and the disappearance of the need for leprosy hospitals, the place was given to the emergence of “a new resurgence of evil, a new face of fear, renewed magical rites of purification and exclusion.” Initially, venereal diseases replaced leprosy, but “the true legacy of leprosy lies in a more complex phenomenon that medicine did not discover until much later: madness.” Foucault listed the “main images” of madness before it was “brought under control, towards the middle of the seventeenth century.” He begins with the Ship of Fools, seeing it not only as a symbol but also as a reality: in the Middle Ages, madmen expelled from the city were sometimes entrusted to certain sailors and ships, which this time were entirely dedicated to therapeutic pilgrimages, and these ships, he says, may have plied up and down the rivers of Europe. Foucault sees these exclusivist journeys as “rituals of exile.” With surprising brevity, he conflates the madness of sin with the madness of disease, as if the Middle Ages had, once again, a “monistic” concept of madness. However, this “monistic” concept of madness exists only for Foucault. This doctrine is in stark contrast to the dualism that has long distinguished between the philosophical, moral, and religious, on the one hand, and the medical, on the other (thus, “a brain impaired by the black vapors of bile,” as Descartes puts it in his *Meditations*, belongs to the medical sphere). Nevertheless, Foucault will draw decisive conclusions from the above, and he will strive to move directly to discussing the establishment of houses of confinement in the seventeenth century as “one of the signs of the advent of the Age of Reason.” Thus, we arrive at the decisive chapter (Chapter Two: “The Great Arrest”): “The Renaissance gave madness its voice, but it controlled its violence, and the Classical Age would come to silence it with a strange force.” But why focus on this point about those afflicted with venereal diseases, since Foucault devotes several pages of his book to them? The reason is that, in the general hospital and the small houses (where there were indeed insane and those afflicted with venereal diseases, and it is worth noting that care was taken at the time to separate the two categories), “for a period of one hundred and fifty years, those afflicted with venereal diseases would mingle with the mentally ill within a single enclosed space; the traces of this mixing would remain present for a long time and would reveal, to the modern conscience, a strange and mysterious proximity that exposed them to the same fate and placed them within the same punitive system. By inventing the space of confinement within the imaginary architecture of morality, the classical era found a homeland, a place of common salvation from sins against the body and from errors contrary to reason.” This argument may seem attractive, but it is far from the truth. In fact, the *ancien régime* viewed those afflicted with venereal diseases as sinners and guilty, but it did not view the insane in the same way. What interests Foucault is not so much truth as perception. And why not? Doesn't he possess the same freedom as philosophers? That freedom, for the sake of which the philosopher prioritizes sense (his own perception and personal sense) over truth. We hope this poses a problem for history.

Foucault's interest shifted from those afflicted with venereal diseases to sodomites, a class whose fate was inevitably severe repression under the *ancien régime* (unless the accused belonged to the upper classes or to the feudal lords). What Foucault wants to demonstrate here is the connection between homosexuality and madness: the classical era had established the division between “the love of reason and the love of unreason.” “Homosexuality belongs to the latter category. Thus, little by little, it began to constitute a degree of madness, and in the modern age, it occupied its place within the realm of unreason.” This means overlooking the fact that the old regime considered homosexuality to be only to a very limited extent comparable to madness; so much so that the judiciary punished the former as a crime (as is evident, in any case, from texts and rarely from actual facts), while it never entertained the idea of punishing a madman for his mental disorder.¹

2. Biological Anthropology and Humor Theory:

¹ Foucault, M. (2006). *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (R. Howard, Trans.). Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203406370>.

Before the advent of modern psychiatry, mental illnesses were explained in light of the theory of the four humors (blood, yellow bile, phlegm, and black bile), which had prevailed since ancient Greece. The influence of this theory is evident in European art, where melancholy was a constant visual element. With the rise of the rationalist and realistic approach of the Renaissance, these symbols gradually began to be undermined, and Caravaggio was one of the most prominent exponents of this shift (Pormann, 2007).

Social Representations & Semiotic Theory: Moscovici & Barthes

Moscovici proposed a definition of social representations as a form of social knowledge that constructs a shared reality for a social group or unit. Their role is to create a system that allows individuals to orient themselves within their social and physical environment and thus to exert control over it. More precisely, they are "a system of values, ideas, and practices related to specific subjects, aspects, and dimensions of the social environment. They not only stabilize the framework of life for individuals and groups, but also serve as a tool for guiding the perception of situations and formulating responses."

This system is therefore an interpretive system, guiding and organizing social interactions between individuals. Social representations are both a body of ideas and a dynamic process through which reality is constructed—a reality that we cannot grasp without them. They appear in various, relatively complex forms, as condensed representations of meaning or reference frameworks that allow us to interpret events and give meaning to the unexpected. Ultimately, they enable us to create frameworks for classifying the subjects and phenomena we encounter daily in social life.

Moscovici argues that the social representations of contemporary societies are analogous to the myths and beliefs held by ancient societies; they are simply the current form of the prevailing common sense. These representations illustrate how what is unfamiliar (information and phenomena) becomes familiar over time. Thus, social representations constitute the essence of social knowledge, as they help us to cognitively grasp and understand the world, and they enhance our ability to communicate about it with others.²

Social psychologist Serge Moscovici first introduced the concept of social perception into psychology in the 1960s. Social perceptions consist of the values, practices, customs, ideas, and beliefs shared among individuals in a society or group. Social perception theory takes this concept and applies it to the principles of social psychology and group dynamics.

To begin with, the term "social perceptions" is a relatively new and widely used term in various social fields. However, it still holds some ambiguity and vagueness for many. It has enjoyed, and continues to enjoy, significant importance in many social and human studies, and has become a distinct discipline taught at various universities around the world, with its own subject, function, and methodology. Through this, cognitive psychology seeks to understand the mental (intellectual) mechanisms that create perceptions. Sociology attempts to study and explain this concept by examining ideologies and the beliefs and ideas they carry that influence our view of the world. Educational science, through the process of analyzing social perceptions, explains the extent of their impact on teaching, learning, and everything related to the educational system. Ultimately, we find that history is concerned with monitoring the changes and developments that have affected intellectual mentalities (culture, thinking, trends, behaviors, and collective actions) in a given society.³

- Intersections and Synergies – Moscovici & Barthes

Despite different roots, SRT and Barthesian Semiotics offer powerful complementary lenses for understanding social meaning:

² Serge Moscovici: *Psychoanalysis: Its Image and Its Public*, Polity, 1st Edition-)En-translation(, 2008

From Abstract to "Natural": Both theories explain how complex or ideological concepts are made simple, concrete, and seemingly natural within a culture/society.

Moscovici: Objectification makes the unfamiliar concrete; Anchoring integrates it into familiar frameworks, making it feel "normal."

Barthes: Myth takes cultural/historical constructs and presents them as self-evident, natural truths through second-order signification.

Socially Constructed Meaning: Both emphasize that meaning is not inherent but constructed collectively within social and cultural contexts. SRs are generated through social interaction; Myths circulate through cultural discourse and media.

The Role of Communication: Communication (language, images, rituals) is the primary vehicle for both the transmission of SRs and the operation of myths.

Ideology and Power: Both approaches are inherently critical:

Moscovici and Barthes provide indispensable tools for analyzing the social construction of reality. Moscovici's SRT offers a framework for understanding the micro-social and cognitive processes by which groups collectively make sense of their world, transforming the unfamiliar into shared common sense. Barthes' semiotics, particularly his concept of myth, provides a critical methodology for dissecting the ideological codes embedded within cultural texts and practices, revealing how power operates by making the cultural appear natural. Together, they illuminate the journey from complex idea to seemingly self-evident truth – a journey paved with social interaction, symbolic transformation, and often, the subtle workings of ideology.

In essence, Moscovici shows us how societies think together, while Barthes helps us see what ideologies those thoughts often unknowingly serve. Their combined legacy is a powerful critical toolkit for navigating the complex, symbolically saturated landscapes of contemporary social life.

-Semantic Variations and Vicarious Functions:

The bipolarity of psychosociological orientations has also favored the accentuation of their subsidiary character with regard to the needs or intrinsic delimitations of neighboring disciplines. Certain conceptions have thus circumscribed the specificity of social psychology, from the outside, so to speak, by based on purely formal confusions or differences. Denise Jodelet, Jean Viet, Philippe Besnard, *La psychologie sociale* (1970) 15A first confusion lies in the idea that our discipline is a mixed discipline, which, like its name, lies between psychology and sociology, compensating for the inadequacies or limitations that each of these sciences imposes on itself, and ensuring a path of passage between them. In other words, it is in the necessities of the development of psychology and sociology that we should seek the origin and reason for social psychology. This field, defined not by an object but by a vicarious role, would constitute a kind of common ground, intersection, or complementarity between the two, where their laws could be refined and their scope of validity extended. Compared to psychology, it would be merely a means of studying general functions such as perception, conditioning, etc., by manipulating variables more complex than just physical variables or by inserting them into a social context. Compared to sociology, it would allow for a more complete approach to those essential social processes that integrate subjective aspects such as attitudes, opinions, etc. To be a psychology for sociologists and a sociology for psychologists would seem to be the position and the end of social psychology, reduced to the rank of an ancillary, intermediary science, caught between two elders who treat it as an accident along the way or a source of method.⁴

The Social Psychology Movement and Its Tensions:

Social psychology presents itself, in terms of acquired results, with a distinctly rhapsodic physiognomy, and in terms of scientific values and orientations, as a system of currents, where theoretical and empirical efforts gradually converge towards the formulation of approaches, empirical procedures, and definitions of objects on which a consensus can be established among researchers. Such progress is slow, and even though it undoubtedly

⁴ Denise Jodelet, Jean Viet, Philippe Besnard *La psychologie sociale* (1970) 20

underlies the latter's aims, one can risk predicting its end as distant, given the families of ideas that coexist, more or less peacefully, in psychosociological culture.

In this sense too, social psychology is a movement: a field of concerns whose relative homogeneity is traversed by currents between which conflicts sometimes arise. Thus, the image emerges of a field of forces shared by lines of tension that threaten to become fault lines between "clans," "schools," and "establishments" that oppose each other in many ways. But this movement could see in this lack of cohesion the hope or the very condition of its establishment as a purified discipline. For the debates that animate it are so fundamentally linked to its scientific status that they can no longer be avoided, and their resolution can only occur through choices that imply, on the part of researchers themselves, adherence to the imperatives of a unitary science or their shift toward neighboring disciplines. These opposing currents and lines of separation that I undertake to describe here can be identified under the headings of methodology, the theoretical universe of reference, and the delimitation of the unit of analysis specific to social psychology.

-The definition of specific units in the psychosociological approach:

It could be that the opposition mentioned in the previous section appears as a question of past and outdated history to a new observer who would confine himself to the statements of psychosociologists on the object of their discipline. Indeed, in recent years, it has become established practice to say that social psychology has social interaction as its object; by which we can assume that the contradiction between the "psychological" and "sociological" perspectives has been resolved.¹

Description, interpretation, prediction, and psychosocial production of Festinger, L.; Ricken, H.W.; Schachter :

"Social Psychology" (1970) But beware: upon closer inspection, it is easy to see that this term encompasses very different meanings. Or rather, there is little agreement on defining the social quality of interaction, the nature and terms of the relationship thus assumed, and even less on analyzing the type of impact that the axes and poles of such a relational system can have on each other. In fact, by taking a notion like social interaction as an object without rigorously examining the dependence of its links and components, one runs the risk of adopting an empty form as an object, which amounts to not adopting an object at all. Such a situation, which today poses a problem.

for social psychology, is not without analogy with the historically known situation of a concept such as "movement," which only became an object of scientific knowledge when, ceasing to be treated as an entity endowed with intrinsic properties, it was broken down by Galileo into elements and relationships. And it seems to me that, in the current state of thinking, recourse to such a notion can only obscure—and how imperfectly!—the very real difficulties that social psychology encounters in defining its unit of observation and analysis, due to the very fact that it remains dependent on a past steeped in different traditions. These traditions or orientations have just been identified and which impact the conception of all aspects of the system of social interaction. Related to these, several representations of the "psychosociological object" emerge, which ultimately posit several "social psychologies" coexisting beneath or despite the guise of interaction. I will now examine these perspectives, which, by slightly shifting the "psychology/sociology" opposition, raise, in my opinion, a major problem for the defense of the scientific status of our discipline.

Psychologists most often believe that this impact and the changes it induces are specific to the psychological functions and activities concerned, and that the laws established by general psychology ultimately allow us to predict the form of the modifications, which are ultimately secondary, produced by social bonds. In fact, as soon as social and interpersonal relationships and interferences intervene, psychological mechanisms and the laws that govern them no longer play a decisive role: it is the nature of the social relationship alone that accounts for the particular forms they then take. Moreover, it erases the differences between psychological mechanisms and functions. It is therefore urgent today to make the transition from a two-term psychology, "Ego-Object," to a three-

term psychology, "Ego-Alter-Object." Psychology to which our discipline would contribute greatly, thereby fulfilling

a prediction that Freud, with his incisive foresight, formulated as early as 1921:

"The opposition between individual psychology and social or collective psychology, which may at first glance seem very profound, loses much of its sharpness upon closer examination. The former undoubtedly has the individual as its object and seeks the means he uses and the paths he follows to obtain the satisfaction of his desires and needs. But in this search, it only rarely succeeds, and in very exceptional cases, in ignoring the relationships that exist between the individual and his fellow human beings." This is because others play

in the individual's life the role of a model, an object, an associate, or an adversary, and individual psychology presents itself from the very beginning as being, at the same time, in a certain way, a social psychology in the broader, but fully justified, sense of the word."⁵

Such are the reflections suggested by an overview of a discipline in flux, by an analysis of the currents that animate the life of a community of researchers. It is now appropriate to turn to what social psychology presents most clearly: its significant productions from the point of view of delimiting the scientific field and defining the frameworks of research.

It is only after having taken an accurate view of the results accumulated over the last decade, marked by a decisive leap in research, that some positive proposals for its better development can be put forward. And this is necessary.

Visual Semiology and the Rhetoric of Absence: Caravaggio's Missing "Sign of Madness" as Semiological Discourse

Traditional art analysis often focuses on present symbols. Yet, as Roland Barthes' structural semiotics and Erhardt Schneider's symbolic intertextuality reveal, **deliberate omission** can be a potent semiotic strategy. Caravaggio's rejection of conventional Renaissance "signs of madness" (wild eyes, disheveled hair, exaggerated gestures) in depictions of ecstatic or violent subjects such as *David with the Head of Goliath* or *The Conversion of Saint Paul* transforms absence into a complex discourse. This void is not negligence; it is a coded statement on rationality, humanity, and the politics of representation.⁶

I. Theoretical Framework: Barthes & Schneider

Barthes' Visual Semiology

Denotation/Connotation: The "madness sign" (e.g., bulging eyes = madness) is a cultural connotation Barthes would label a "myth" (a naturalized ideological construct). By omitting it, Caravaggio denaturalizes the trope.

The Punctum of Absence: Barthes' concept of the punctum—the detail that "pierces" the viewer—can apply to what is missing. The lack of grotesque coding forces viewers to confront the subject's humanity instead of reducing them to pathology.

III. Absence as Semiological Discourse

⁵ Barthes, R. (1977). **Image, Music, Text** (S. Heath, Trans.). Fontana Press.

⁶ Scull, A. (2015). **Madness in Civilization: A Cultural History of Insanity**. Princeton University Press.

Semiotic Function	Barthes' Lens	Schneider's Intertextuality
De-naturalization of Myth	Challenges "madness" as innate trait; exposes cultural construction.	Responds to art history's pathologization of ecstasy.
Ideological Critique	Rejects Church/State use of "madness" to marginalize dissent.	Dialogues with Inquisition-era fear of non-conformity.

The Greek physician Hippocrates, considered the father of medicine, shared this view. Instead of simply examining teeth to understand people's differences, he studied the entire human body. In the third century BC, he theorized that human health and personality were controlled by four main fluids: yellow bile from the liver, black bile from the kidneys, blood from the heart, and phlegm from the brain. He explained our different personalities based on the amounts of these different fluids in our bodies. That's why.

He looked at the human mind and saw that, contrary to the prevailing belief at the time, humans were unconscious of everything that happened within them. They were conscious of only one-tenth of their thoughts. He said, "No, but where do the rest of the thoughts happen, Abu Hamid?" In the subconscious mind, I give you a picture of a mind in the form of an iceberg: all your thoughts, feelings, and actions that you are conscious of. Personality is torn apart by a conflict that occurs in the unconscious between our desire for momentary pleasure, which we all desire without regard for morals or laws, and the other side, the conscience, which is formed from the teachings of family, society, and religion. This great relationship brings three symbolic entities into existence: the id, the ego, and the superego, or the famous protection: the id, the ego, and the superego.

The id or dominant id, in simple cases, gives you a personality that always prefers your own pleasure over anything else. In extreme cases, this dominant id results in a personality that has no regard for society or people and has no problem harming anyone for its own personal gain. In short, you become a criminal psychopath. However, if the super ego is dominant, it will make you a committed and disciplined person, but this will depend on the person himself, and he will always have a sense of obligation. My dear Freud, if he saw you and asked him why people have different personalities, he would tell you, "By God, it depends on the control." If the id is dominant in you, then you are a frivolous person who wants pleasure at all times. Whereas, if the super ego is dominant, then you are a man who is not free from pleasure at all and always wants obligation and wants to excel, and that's it.

Freud says things that seem logical and scientific and something like that. In fact, even Freud was criticized because his words, although they were English, logical, and balanced in appearance, were not scientific enough. Science, that is, something I can despair of and try out. But you tell me, mountains, ice, ego, and ID 14%.

Is the behavioral school a good Internet school? This behavioral school was more interested in analyzing the part of us that appears in behaviors and actions and they see that these are the keys to our personalities. They did not pay any attention to anything that cannot be measured or criminalized like horoscopes or Uncle Bekhar or even Freud's concepts of the subconscious mind. As long as you do not see this subconscious mind, it is invalid.

The view of the biological school group was that genes, not the environment, shape personality. Because of this difference in thinking, you find the behavioral school group and the biological school group always mismatched and divided among themselves. For biologists, the best test for them is concordance. But biologists weren't interested in twins in general. They were interested in twins who were separated after birth, each one of them raised in a different environment. This is what happens when a mother puts her twin up for adoption. Usually, each one ends up in a different family. This type of twin was important to them because through it we can separate the genetic factor from the environmental factor. In other words, I have two twins with the same genes, just a copy, but each one grew up and was raised in a different environment.

The two of you found that each one has personality traits that are different from the other. What does this mean? That the environment is what determines the personality and that twins are the same, almost a copy of the genes. But if you went to them and found that the personalities, even when they were in it, were different, then the factor and my head are not only drawing our misery, but also drawing our personalities. From here was born one of the most famous experiments in this field, the study of twins who were thrown away. The study began in 1979 and continued until 1990. During this period, scientists followed two twins who lived apart from each other. The surprise was that the similarity rate of the personalities of the twins who broke up was the same as the similarity rate between the personalities of the twins who grew up together in the movie. Perhaps the strangest case in this study was the case of James Berenger and Jim Lewis, who broke up. They both work in the same business, love the same brand of cigarettes, and have the same model of the same car. Up until now, it's normal for us to have the same things. But what wasn't normal was that the other two got married more than once. The name of both of them was Linda, and when they got divorced, they got married again. Each one of them married a woman named Betty. Not only that, but they both named their first child James. They had a dog when they were young, named Toy. Their lives are layered.

A new science has emerged that attempts to explain this story and many other things. A literal translation, above all improving it, is that these are cases in which DNA or religion does not change. This means that it doesn't matter because DNA is fixed and does not change. However, changes occur in the way genes affect the body. Do you understand what that means? A natural condition can cause this gene to be activated, so it becomes 50% active? You forget what makes this happen. Only the environment controls gene expression, and your lifestyle choices and the environment you live in play a fundamental role. Libido genetics is not only interested in this, but also researching whether these changes can be transmitted from generation to generation. Neither the environment alone nor genes alone determine personality 100%. It's a mixture and interaction of both. You may have genes, but the burden is more like the upbringing you were raised in and the experiences you went through. These are what determine this. Freud's theories explain personality formation through consciousness, behavioral theories explain it through the environment, and biologists explain it through genes. We know the answer to why our personalities differ from each other, and we finally know that the environment and genes combine to influence personalities. In the midst of all the schools we talked about, a school emerged that was not originally interested in explaining how personality is, but rather interested in how we can describe personality. The subject began with the American psychologist Jordan Allport, who asked himself a question: If I were to hold any human being and try to limit his personality to a set of traits, what would these traits be? From here, the trait theory or trait theory began. In order for Jordan to answer this question, he collected a set of objective or traits. Years later, psychiatrists tried to reduce the number of these traits to a smaller number, and they actually arrived at five traits, but they are called the Big Five or the Big Five. Number one is openness or extroversion. How extroverted is this person? Number two is conscientiousness. Number three is extroversion, which is the opposite of introversion. This is someone who loves to socialize and meet people. Number four is agreeableness. Number five is neuroticism, which is the level of negative emotions you have⁷.

Let's move on to the last trait, neuroticism. If you are 100% neurotic, you are a moody person, always distracted and anxious, and anything can make you angry or upset. But if you are 0%, you are the perfect example of working well under stress, which we are known for in every calm and relaxing app. You have effective stability, which is enough. Of course, we as humans are not very busy. It becomes difficult to diagnose and rehabilitate due to the dynamic state of psychological conflict between good and evil present in man, as well as his sense of energy sometimes, as his mind deceives him through successive collapses of consciousness under the pressure of circumstances and the inability to adapt and cope in light of the entity of the space-time dimension clashing between habits, needs and desires in a social, psychological and behavioral environment and conflicting emotions that are established in light of clinical geopolitics and the difficult reality in light of multiple bottlenecks such as Suffocation by Covid, suffocation by energy, and suffocation by the transition to electronic sponsorship, amidst the image's conflict between reality, symbolism, and the human mental imagination, imprinted with the concepts of Nietzsche's hammer philosopher, or the existential alienation of Kafka, according to Qarqouri Samsa, who

⁷ cassar.P. michelangelo merisi da Caravaggio. The creative psyhopath. Melita historica.1989.

continues to confront madness without defining the poles, as it has become a title for many of the characteristics of metacognitive alienation.

Conclusion:

We can Considering perception in a broad sense as a way of organizing our knowledge of social reality and social structures, such knowledge is inherently shaped by our own internal processes. Since everyday life is permeated by a system of social perceptions, this system, in turn, dictates individual behaviors, reflecting and expressing beliefs, attitudes, and ideologies within social life. Perception also falls within the spectrum of sociological and psychological concepts, possessing a dual nature (psychological/social), making it a complex theoretical system. It takes into account, on the one hand, the cognitive processes of the individual mind, and on the other, the social processes of groups and the interactions that influence their formation, structure, and development. Therefore, social perceptions must be studied by considering affective, cognitive, and social factors. The primary objective of studying social perceptions is to understand and analyze how a new phenomenon, scientific theory, or political idea spreads within a culture and society, how it transforms in the course of these processes, and how it alters our perception of ourselves and the world we live in..

Acknowledgment

The author expresses sincere gratitude to the University Center of Maghnia, Tlemcen, for its intellectual support and access to institutional resources that facilitated this research. Special thanks are also extended to colleagues in the Departments of Anthropology and Fine Arts for their constructive comments on early drafts of this paper, as well as to the anonymous reviewers for their insightful feedback that strengthened the interdisciplinary analysis.

Ethical Considerations

This study did not involve human participants, animals, or clinical data, and therefore did not require formal ethical approval. All secondary materials, including artworks, scholarly references, and archival sources, were analyzed in compliance with academic integrity standards and proper citation practices. The author affirms that this research adheres to the ethical principles of originality, transparency, and intellectual honesty.

Methodology

The research adopted a qualitative, interdisciplinary methodology integrating art-historical, anthropological, and semiotic approaches.

1. **Art-Historical Analysis:** Major paintings by Caravaggio were examined through formal and contextual interpretation, with attention to compositional technique, iconographic structure, and thematic evolution.
2. **Semiotic and Foucauldian Framework:** Visual semiotics was employed to decode representational patterns of emotion and pathology, while Foucauldian discourse analysis provided a theoretical foundation for interpreting power relations and social constraints during the Counter-Reformation.
3. **Comparative Anthropological Lens:** The study incorporated insights from biological anthropology and cultural history to contextualize depictions of the human body and mental deviance within early modern social determinants.

This triangulated approach allowed for a holistic understanding of the decline of figurative representations of mental pathology in Caravaggio's works.

Funding

This research received no specific grant from any public, commercial, or not-for-profit funding agency. The study was conducted independently as part of the author's academic engagement at the University Center of Maghnia, Tlemcen, Algeria.

Conflict of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest. The content and conclusions of this paper are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the institutional views of the University Center of Maghnia.

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